An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option
This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improv...
Main Author: | Koffi Serge William Yao |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2021-10-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/4/83 |
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