Legal Interpretivism versus Legal Pragmatism: an Assessment
Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivism contains significant elements which might be both regarded as advantages and disadvantages of this legal theory. Among them, the main one is the concept of “theoretical ascent”. He deliberately targets many pragmatist theories, especially in moral and legal philosophy...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages
2020-04-01
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| Series: | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
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| Online Access: | https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_10302_d5faa036bc620099a19bb4e9dafc54aa.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797723736840863744 |
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| author | Morteza Nouri |
| author_facet | Morteza Nouri |
| author_sort | Morteza Nouri |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivism contains significant elements which might be both regarded as advantages and disadvantages of this legal theory. Among them, the main one is the concept of “theoretical ascent”. He deliberately targets many pragmatist theories, especially in moral and legal philosophy, with the aid of this concept. On the other hand, this concept, overloaded with metaphysical presuppositions, is highly susceptible to well-known pragmatistic criticisms. So, in this essay, I shall follow two main objectives: 1) I would try to remove superfluous, metaphysical assumptions from his legal theory and adjust it finely to everyday practices of judges and lawyers, thereby increasing its practicality; 2) I would try to show that his interpretivism, grounded on the concept of “theoretical ascent”, could better explain the significant contribution of “theorization” to legal practices, compared to pragmatistic explanations, provided it reduces its notorious metaphysical connotations. In other words, I shall argue that an adjustment on both sides in this conflict say, at the parts of legal interpretivism and legal pragmatism, would lead us to a more inclusive legal theory which does better justice to both “theoretical and practical aspects” of legal practices in everyday life. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T10:07:04Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-17e1daed0ae3424a8f7ddefc84c49dfb |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2251-7960 2423-4419 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T10:07:04Z |
| publishDate | 2020-04-01 |
| publisher | University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
| spelling | doaj.art-17e1daed0ae3424a8f7ddefc84c49dfb2023-09-02T11:08:02ZengUniversity of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen LanguagesJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-79602423-44192020-04-01143010112110.22034/jpiut.2020.35121.237310302Legal Interpretivism versus Legal Pragmatism: an AssessmentMorteza Nouri0Assistant professor, Department of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti UniversityRonald Dworkin’s interpretivism contains significant elements which might be both regarded as advantages and disadvantages of this legal theory. Among them, the main one is the concept of “theoretical ascent”. He deliberately targets many pragmatist theories, especially in moral and legal philosophy, with the aid of this concept. On the other hand, this concept, overloaded with metaphysical presuppositions, is highly susceptible to well-known pragmatistic criticisms. So, in this essay, I shall follow two main objectives: 1) I would try to remove superfluous, metaphysical assumptions from his legal theory and adjust it finely to everyday practices of judges and lawyers, thereby increasing its practicality; 2) I would try to show that his interpretivism, grounded on the concept of “theoretical ascent”, could better explain the significant contribution of “theorization” to legal practices, compared to pragmatistic explanations, provided it reduces its notorious metaphysical connotations. In other words, I shall argue that an adjustment on both sides in this conflict say, at the parts of legal interpretivism and legal pragmatism, would lead us to a more inclusive legal theory which does better justice to both “theoretical and practical aspects” of legal practices in everyday life.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_10302_d5faa036bc620099a19bb4e9dafc54aa.pdflegal interpretivismlegal pragmatismthe law as integritytheoretical ascentlegal theory |
| spellingShingle | Morteza Nouri Legal Interpretivism versus Legal Pragmatism: an Assessment Journal of Philosophical Investigations legal interpretivism legal pragmatism the law as integrity theoretical ascent legal theory |
| title | Legal Interpretivism versus Legal Pragmatism: an Assessment |
| title_full | Legal Interpretivism versus Legal Pragmatism: an Assessment |
| title_fullStr | Legal Interpretivism versus Legal Pragmatism: an Assessment |
| title_full_unstemmed | Legal Interpretivism versus Legal Pragmatism: an Assessment |
| title_short | Legal Interpretivism versus Legal Pragmatism: an Assessment |
| title_sort | legal interpretivism versus legal pragmatism an assessment |
| topic | legal interpretivism legal pragmatism the law as integrity theoretical ascent legal theory |
| url | https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_10302_d5faa036bc620099a19bb4e9dafc54aa.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mortezanouri legalinterpretivismversuslegalpragmatismanassessment |