Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony

In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The...

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Main Author: Jesús VEGA ENCABO
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of the Basque Country 2008-01-01
Series:Theoria
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/5
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author Jesús VEGA ENCABO
author_facet Jesús VEGA ENCABO
author_sort Jesús VEGA ENCABO
collection DOAJ
description In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous exercise of our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that need to consider their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recognise certain epistemic requirements.
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spelling doaj.art-17f0af00b8cd4f50a6ffcf71f2dfebab2022-12-22T00:20:59ZengUniversity of the Basque CountryTheoria0495-45482171-679X2008-01-01231455610.1387/theoria.55Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimonyJesús VEGA ENCABOIn this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous exercise of our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that need to consider their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recognise certain epistemic requirements.http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/5merit, testimony, epistemic autonomy, virtue epistemology, epistemic perspective.
spellingShingle Jesús VEGA ENCABO
Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony
Theoria
merit, testimony, epistemic autonomy, virtue epistemology, epistemic perspective.
title Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony
title_full Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony
title_fullStr Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony
title_full_unstemmed Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony
title_short Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony
title_sort epistemic merit autonomy and testimony
topic merit, testimony, epistemic autonomy, virtue epistemology, epistemic perspective.
url http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/5
work_keys_str_mv AT jesusvegaencabo epistemicmeritautonomyandtestimony