Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony
In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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University of the Basque Country
2008-01-01
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Series: | Theoria |
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Online Access: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/5 |
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author | Jesús VEGA ENCABO |
author_facet | Jesús VEGA ENCABO |
author_sort | Jesús VEGA ENCABO |
collection | DOAJ |
description | In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous exercise of our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that need to consider their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recognise certain epistemic requirements. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-12T14:51:37Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-17f0af00b8cd4f50a6ffcf71f2dfebab |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 0495-4548 2171-679X |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-12T14:51:37Z |
publishDate | 2008-01-01 |
publisher | University of the Basque Country |
record_format | Article |
series | Theoria |
spelling | doaj.art-17f0af00b8cd4f50a6ffcf71f2dfebab2022-12-22T00:20:59ZengUniversity of the Basque CountryTheoria0495-45482171-679X2008-01-01231455610.1387/theoria.55Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimonyJesús VEGA ENCABOIn this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous exercise of our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that need to consider their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recognise certain epistemic requirements.http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/5merit, testimony, epistemic autonomy, virtue epistemology, epistemic perspective. |
spellingShingle | Jesús VEGA ENCABO Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony Theoria merit, testimony, epistemic autonomy, virtue epistemology, epistemic perspective. |
title | Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony |
title_full | Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony |
title_fullStr | Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony |
title_full_unstemmed | Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony |
title_short | Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony |
title_sort | epistemic merit autonomy and testimony |
topic | merit, testimony, epistemic autonomy, virtue epistemology, epistemic perspective. |
url | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/5 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT jesusvegaencabo epistemicmeritautonomyandtestimony |