Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology?
This article deals with the question whether innateness ascriptions in cognitive science---for instance, the postulation of an innate language faculty---can avoid tautology. First I shall argue that innateness is very difficult to define. As a dispositional notion, innateness faces the ``problem of...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Éditions Kimé
2014-10-01
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| Series: | Philosophia Scientiæ |
| Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/1013 |
| _version_ | 1797402515509084160 |
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| author | Valentine Reynaud |
| author_facet | Valentine Reynaud |
| author_sort | Valentine Reynaud |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This article deals with the question whether innateness ascriptions in cognitive science---for instance, the postulation of an innate language faculty---can avoid tautology. First I shall argue that innateness is very difficult to define. As a dispositional notion, innateness faces the ``problem of tautology’’ first outlined by Locke. Innateness ascriptions, regardless of their belonging to a nativist or an empiricist framework (indeed even empiricists have to formulate some of them), always depend on a peculiar view of cognitive development. But this fact far from condemning innateness ascriptions as tautological claims, offers an external operatory criterion to legitimise them: innateness ascriptions are justified when they rely on a satisfactory developmental explanation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T02:26:23Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-1809a3a0376e44fba6dce3eed48eb8f1 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1281-2463 1775-4283 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T02:26:23Z |
| publishDate | 2014-10-01 |
| publisher | Éditions Kimé |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Philosophia Scientiæ |
| spelling | doaj.art-1809a3a0376e44fba6dce3eed48eb8f12023-12-06T15:53:47ZdeuÉditions KiméPhilosophia Scientiæ1281-24631775-42832014-10-0118317719010.4000/philosophiascientiae.1013Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology?Valentine ReynaudThis article deals with the question whether innateness ascriptions in cognitive science---for instance, the postulation of an innate language faculty---can avoid tautology. First I shall argue that innateness is very difficult to define. As a dispositional notion, innateness faces the ``problem of tautology’’ first outlined by Locke. Innateness ascriptions, regardless of their belonging to a nativist or an empiricist framework (indeed even empiricists have to formulate some of them), always depend on a peculiar view of cognitive development. But this fact far from condemning innateness ascriptions as tautological claims, offers an external operatory criterion to legitimise them: innateness ascriptions are justified when they rely on a satisfactory developmental explanation.http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/1013 |
| spellingShingle | Valentine Reynaud Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology? Philosophia Scientiæ |
| title | Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology? |
| title_full | Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology? |
| title_fullStr | Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology? |
| title_short | Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology? |
| title_sort | can innateness ascriptions avoid tautology |
| url | http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/1013 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT valentinereynaud caninnatenessascriptionsavoidtautology |