Information, incentives, and goals in election forecasts

Presidential elections can be forecast using information from political and economic conditions, polls, and a statistical model of changes in public opinion over time. However, these ``knowns'' about how to make a good presidential election forecast come with many unknowns due to the chall...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Andrew Gelman, Jessica Hullman, Christopher Wlezien, George Elliott Morris
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2020-09-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journal.sjdm.org/20/200907b/jdm200907b.pdf
Description
Summary:Presidential elections can be forecast using information from political and economic conditions, polls, and a statistical model of changes in public opinion over time. However, these ``knowns'' about how to make a good presidential election forecast come with many unknowns due to the challenges of evaluating forecast calibration and communication. We highlight how incentives may shape forecasts, and particularly forecast uncertainty, in light of calibration challenges. We illustrate these challenges in creating, communicating, and evaluating election predictions, using the Economist and Fivethirtyeight forecasts of the 2020 election as examples, and offer recommendations for forecasters and scholars.
ISSN:1930-2975