Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises
Statistics show that humans’ unsafe behaviors are the main cause of accidents. Because of the asymmetry of game benefits between managers and coal miners, the stability of workers’ behaviors is affected and unsafe behaviors are produced. In this paper, the symmetry of the behavio...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Symmetry |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/11/2/156 |
| _version_ | 1798004011900600320 |
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| author | Kai Yu Lujie Zhou Qinggui Cao Zhen Li |
| author_facet | Kai Yu Lujie Zhou Qinggui Cao Zhen Li |
| author_sort | Kai Yu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Statistics show that humans’ unsafe behaviors are the main cause of accidents. Because of the asymmetry of game benefits between managers and coal miners, the stability of workers’ behaviors is affected and unsafe behaviors are produced. In this paper, the symmetry of the behavior benefits of coal mine workers is studied, using game theory. In order to observe the dynamic game evolution process of behavioral stability, the paper establishes a system dynamics (SD) model and simulates it. The SD simulation results show that with the continuation of the game, when the benefits for safety managers and workers are asymmetric and the safety manager’s safety inspection benefits are less than the non-inspection benefits, the manager may not conduct safety inspections, which poses a great hidden danger to safety production. Through dynamic incentives to regulate the symmetry of income of coal mine safety managers and coal mine workers, the purpose of enhancing the stability of safety behavior is achieved. The research results of the paper have been successfully applied to coal mine enterprises. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T12:16:48Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-194eb1f4d38d411cb425e280a6fac6a5 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-8994 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T12:16:48Z |
| publishDate | 2019-01-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Symmetry |
| spelling | doaj.art-194eb1f4d38d411cb425e280a6fac6a52022-12-22T04:24:16ZengMDPI AGSymmetry2073-89942019-01-0111215610.3390/sym11020156sym11020156Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine EnterprisesKai Yu0Lujie Zhou1Qinggui Cao2Zhen Li3College of Mining and Safety Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, ChinaCollege of Mining and Safety Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, ChinaCollege of Mining and Safety Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, ChinaCollege of Mining and Safety Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, ChinaStatistics show that humans’ unsafe behaviors are the main cause of accidents. Because of the asymmetry of game benefits between managers and coal miners, the stability of workers’ behaviors is affected and unsafe behaviors are produced. In this paper, the symmetry of the behavior benefits of coal mine workers is studied, using game theory. In order to observe the dynamic game evolution process of behavioral stability, the paper establishes a system dynamics (SD) model and simulates it. The SD simulation results show that with the continuation of the game, when the benefits for safety managers and workers are asymmetric and the safety manager’s safety inspection benefits are less than the non-inspection benefits, the manager may not conduct safety inspections, which poses a great hidden danger to safety production. Through dynamic incentives to regulate the symmetry of income of coal mine safety managers and coal mine workers, the purpose of enhancing the stability of safety behavior is achieved. The research results of the paper have been successfully applied to coal mine enterprises.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/11/2/156benefits symmetrybehavioral stabilityevolutionary gamesystem dynamicsdynamic incentive |
| spellingShingle | Kai Yu Lujie Zhou Qinggui Cao Zhen Li Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises Symmetry benefits symmetry behavioral stability evolutionary game system dynamics dynamic incentive |
| title | Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises |
| title_full | Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises |
| title_fullStr | Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises |
| title_short | Evolutionary Game Research on Symmetry of Workers’ Behavior in Coal Mine Enterprises |
| title_sort | evolutionary game research on symmetry of workers behavior in coal mine enterprises |
| topic | benefits symmetry behavioral stability evolutionary game system dynamics dynamic incentive |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/11/2/156 |
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