On the Possibility of a General Purge of Self-Reference
My aim in this paper is to gather some evident in favor of the view that a general purge of self-reference is possible. I do this by considering a modal-epistemic version of the Liar Paradox introduced by Roy Cook. Using yabloesque techniques, I show that it is possible to transform this circular pa...
Main Author: | Lucas Rosenblatt |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF)
2012-05-01
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Series: | Análisis Filosófico |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/109 |
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