Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg

Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual acti...

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Main Author: Ludwig Kirk
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Vienna 2019-10-01
Series:Journal of Social Ontology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0039
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author Ludwig Kirk
author_facet Ludwig Kirk
author_sort Ludwig Kirk
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description Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions. The second is that singular action sentences entail that there is no more than one agent of the event expressed by the action verb in the way required by that verb (the sole agency requirement). The third, is that an individual intention, e.g. to build a boat, is not satisfied if you don’t do it yourself. On the first point, I grant that Blomberg identifies an important distinction between simple and composite actions the book did not take into account, but argue it doesn’t show that there are collective actions in the same sense there are individual actions. On the second point, I argue from examples that the collective reading of plural action sentences doesn’t entail the distributive reading, which requires the sole agency requirement on singular action sentences. This settles the third point, since it entails that if you intend to build a boat, you are successful only if you are the only agent of it in the sense required by the verb.
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spelling doaj.art-1a7ed64daaec417eba08085a86dc0c392023-09-03T04:04:29ZengUniversity of ViennaJournal of Social Ontology2196-96552196-96632019-10-015112514610.1515/jso-2019-0039jso-2019-0039Individual and Collective Action: Reply to BlombergLudwig Kirk0Indiana University Bloomington, Department of Philosophy, Bloomington, IN, USAOlle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions. The second is that singular action sentences entail that there is no more than one agent of the event expressed by the action verb in the way required by that verb (the sole agency requirement). The third, is that an individual intention, e.g. to build a boat, is not satisfied if you don’t do it yourself. On the first point, I grant that Blomberg identifies an important distinction between simple and composite actions the book did not take into account, but argue it doesn’t show that there are collective actions in the same sense there are individual actions. On the second point, I argue from examples that the collective reading of plural action sentences doesn’t entail the distributive reading, which requires the sole agency requirement on singular action sentences. This settles the third point, since it entails that if you intend to build a boat, you are successful only if you are the only agent of it in the sense required by the verb.https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0039collective actionshared intentionsingular action sentencesplural action sentenceslogical form
spellingShingle Ludwig Kirk
Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg
Journal of Social Ontology
collective action
shared intention
singular action sentences
plural action sentences
logical form
title Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg
title_full Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg
title_fullStr Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg
title_full_unstemmed Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg
title_short Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg
title_sort individual and collective action reply to blomberg
topic collective action
shared intention
singular action sentences
plural action sentences
logical form
url https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0039
work_keys_str_mv AT ludwigkirk individualandcollectiveactionreplytoblomberg