Grounding, Essential Properties and the Unity Problem

A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made up of non-factual constituents such as properties, relations and property-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unity problem, the problem of explaining why various constituents are combined to form a fact. In many cases t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Donnchadh O'Conaill
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Philosophie.ch 2020-04-01
Series:Dialectica
Online Access:https://dialectica.philosophie.ch/dialectica/article/view/6
Description
Summary:A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made up of non-factual constituents such as properties, relations and property-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unity problem, the problem of explaining why various constituents are combined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could have existed without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what are they so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity problem. First, facts which are grounded are unified by the obtaining of their grounds. Second, many ungrounded facts are such that they must obtain if their non-factual constituents exist (e.g. if the property $F$ness is essential to a particular, $a$, then if $a$ exists the fact that $a$ is $F$ must obtain). In this way the obtaining of these facts is explained by the essence of some of their constituents. I also address the possibility of facts which are brutely unified (i.e. neither grounded nor essentially unified), and compare the account I offer with some of the main alternatives.
ISSN:0012-2017
1746-8361