The Content of a Seeing-As Experience
In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conc...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Firenze University Press
2013-05-01
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| Series: | Aisthesis |
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| Online Access: | https://oajournals.fupress.net/index.php/aisthesis/article/view/657 |
| Summary: | In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is an overall experience of seeing something as a picture that is identical with Wollheim’s seeing-in experience and is constituted by an experience of organizational seeing-as (its configurational fold) and by an experience of knowingly illusory seeing-as (its recognitional fold). To my mind, Wittgenstein’s reflections on seeing-as have anticipated these claims. |
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| ISSN: | 2035-8466 |