Revisiting structure graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC

In [2], Bellare, Pietrzak and Rogaway proved an O⁢(ℓ⁢q2/2n)${O(\ell q^{2}/2^{n})}$ bound for the PRF (pseudorandom function) security of the CBC-MAC based on an n-bit random permutation Π, provided ℓ<2n/3${\ell<2^{n/3}}$. Here an adversary can make at most q prefix-free queries each having at...

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Main Authors: Jha Ashwin, Nandi Mridul
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: De Gruyter 2016-12-01
Series:Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2016-0030
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author Jha Ashwin
Nandi Mridul
author_facet Jha Ashwin
Nandi Mridul
author_sort Jha Ashwin
collection DOAJ
description In [2], Bellare, Pietrzak and Rogaway proved an O⁢(ℓ⁢q2/2n)${O(\ell q^{2}/2^{n})}$ bound for the PRF (pseudorandom function) security of the CBC-MAC based on an n-bit random permutation Π, provided ℓ<2n/3${\ell<2^{n/3}}$. Here an adversary can make at most q prefix-free queries each having at most ℓ${\ell}$ many “blocks” (elements of {0,1}n${\{0,1\}^{n}}$). In the same paper an O⁢(ℓo⁢(1)⁢q2/2n)${O(\ell^{o(1)}q^{2}/2^{n})}$ bound for EMAC (or encrypted CBC-MAC) was proved, provided ℓ<2n/4${\ell<2^{n/4}}$. Both proofs are based on structure graphs representing all collisions among “intermediate inputs” to Π during the computation of CBC. The problem of bounding PRF-advantage is shown to be reduced to bounding the number of structure graphs satisfying certain collision patterns. In the present paper, we show that [2, Lemma 10], stating an important result on structure graphs, is incorrect. This is due to the fact that the authors overlooked certain structure graphs. This invalidates the proofs of the PRF bounds. In [31], Pietrzak improved the bound for EMAC by showing a tight bound O⁢(q2/2n)${O(q^{2}/2^{n})}$ under the restriction that ℓ<2n/8${\ell<2^{n/8}}$. As he used the same flawed lemma, this proof also becomes invalid. In this paper, we have revised and sometimes simplified these proofs. We revisit structure graphs in a slightly different mathematical language and provide a complete characterization of certain types of structure graphs. Using this characterization, we show that PRF security of CBC-MAC is about σ⁢q/2n${\sigma q/2^{n}}$ provided ℓ<2n/3${\ell<2^{n/3}}$ where σ is the total number of blocks in all queries. We also recover tight bound for PRF security of EMAC with a much relaxed constraint (ℓ<2n/4${\ell<2^{n/4}}$) than the original (ℓ<2n/8${\ell<2^{n/8}}$).
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spelling doaj.art-1c4d20fa0a0643ff840ed415441bb2f82022-12-22T04:28:21ZengDe GruyterJournal of Mathematical Cryptology1862-29761862-29842016-12-01103-415718010.1515/jmc-2016-0030Revisiting structure graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMACJha Ashwin0Nandi Mridul1Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, IndiaIndian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, IndiaIn [2], Bellare, Pietrzak and Rogaway proved an O⁢(ℓ⁢q2/2n)${O(\ell q^{2}/2^{n})}$ bound for the PRF (pseudorandom function) security of the CBC-MAC based on an n-bit random permutation Π, provided ℓ<2n/3${\ell<2^{n/3}}$. Here an adversary can make at most q prefix-free queries each having at most ℓ${\ell}$ many “blocks” (elements of {0,1}n${\{0,1\}^{n}}$). In the same paper an O⁢(ℓo⁢(1)⁢q2/2n)${O(\ell^{o(1)}q^{2}/2^{n})}$ bound for EMAC (or encrypted CBC-MAC) was proved, provided ℓ<2n/4${\ell<2^{n/4}}$. Both proofs are based on structure graphs representing all collisions among “intermediate inputs” to Π during the computation of CBC. The problem of bounding PRF-advantage is shown to be reduced to bounding the number of structure graphs satisfying certain collision patterns. In the present paper, we show that [2, Lemma 10], stating an important result on structure graphs, is incorrect. This is due to the fact that the authors overlooked certain structure graphs. This invalidates the proofs of the PRF bounds. In [31], Pietrzak improved the bound for EMAC by showing a tight bound O⁢(q2/2n)${O(q^{2}/2^{n})}$ under the restriction that ℓ<2n/8${\ell<2^{n/8}}$. As he used the same flawed lemma, this proof also becomes invalid. In this paper, we have revised and sometimes simplified these proofs. We revisit structure graphs in a slightly different mathematical language and provide a complete characterization of certain types of structure graphs. Using this characterization, we show that PRF security of CBC-MAC is about σ⁢q/2n${\sigma q/2^{n}}$ provided ℓ<2n/3${\ell<2^{n/3}}$ where σ is the total number of blocks in all queries. We also recover tight bound for PRF security of EMAC with a much relaxed constraint (ℓ<2n/4${\ell<2^{n/4}}$) than the original (ℓ<2n/8${\ell<2^{n/8}}$).https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2016-0030cbcemacstructure graphrandom permutationpseudorandom function94a60 68r05 68r10 68q87
spellingShingle Jha Ashwin
Nandi Mridul
Revisiting structure graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC
Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
cbc
emac
structure graph
random permutation
pseudorandom function
94a60
68r05
68r10
68q87
title Revisiting structure graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC
title_full Revisiting structure graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC
title_fullStr Revisiting structure graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC
title_full_unstemmed Revisiting structure graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC
title_short Revisiting structure graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC
title_sort revisiting structure graphs applications to cbc mac and emac
topic cbc
emac
structure graph
random permutation
pseudorandom function
94a60
68r05
68r10
68q87
url https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2016-0030
work_keys_str_mv AT jhaashwin revisitingstructuregraphsapplicationstocbcmacandemac
AT nandimridul revisitingstructuregraphsapplicationstocbcmacandemac