Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
Abstract In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092, 2014), we prove an existence theorem. As an application,...
Main Author: | Jinlu Li |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
SpringerOpen
2018-04-01
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Series: | Fixed Point Theory and Applications |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13663-018-0636-1 |
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