Abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber‐physical systems
Abstract The exponential increase in IoT device usage has spawned numerous cyberspace innovations. IoT devices, sensors, and actuators bridge the gap between physical processes and the cyber network in a cyber‐physical system (CPS). Cyber‐physical system is a complex system from a security perspecti...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2023-03-01
|
| Series: | CAAI Transactions on Intelligence Technology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1049/cit2.12171 |
| _version_ | 1797871124472659968 |
|---|---|
| author | Viraj Singh Gaur Vishal Sharma John McAllister |
| author_facet | Viraj Singh Gaur Vishal Sharma John McAllister |
| author_sort | Viraj Singh Gaur |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract The exponential increase in IoT device usage has spawned numerous cyberspace innovations. IoT devices, sensors, and actuators bridge the gap between physical processes and the cyber network in a cyber‐physical system (CPS). Cyber‐physical system is a complex system from a security perspective due to the heterogeneous nature of its components and the fact that IoT devices can serve as an entry point for cyberattacks. Most adversaries design their attack strategies on systems to gain an advantage at a relatively lower cost, whereas abusive adversaries initiate an attack to inflict maximum damage without regard to cost or reward. In this paper, a sensor spoofing attack is modelled as a malicious adversary attempting to cause system failure by interfering with the feedback control mechanism. It is accomplished by feeding spoofed sensor values to the controller and issuing erroneous commands to the actuator. Experiments on a Simulink‐simulated linear CPS support the proof of concept for the proposed abusive ideology, demonstrating three attack strategies. The impact of the evaluations stresses the importance of testing the CPS security against adversaries with abusive settings for preventing cyber‐vandalism. Finally, the research concludes by highlighting the limitations of the proposed work, followed by recommendations for the future. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-10T00:38:10Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-1de92851afe346688827c6df27af9a1a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2468-2322 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-10T00:38:10Z |
| publishDate | 2023-03-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | CAAI Transactions on Intelligence Technology |
| spelling | doaj.art-1de92851afe346688827c6df27af9a1a2023-03-14T08:04:43ZengWileyCAAI Transactions on Intelligence Technology2468-23222023-03-018114916510.1049/cit2.12171Abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber‐physical systemsViraj Singh Gaur0Vishal Sharma1John McAllister2School of Electronics Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Queen's University Belfast Belfast UKSchool of Electronics Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Queen's University Belfast Belfast UKSchool of Electronics Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Queen's University Belfast Belfast UKAbstract The exponential increase in IoT device usage has spawned numerous cyberspace innovations. IoT devices, sensors, and actuators bridge the gap between physical processes and the cyber network in a cyber‐physical system (CPS). Cyber‐physical system is a complex system from a security perspective due to the heterogeneous nature of its components and the fact that IoT devices can serve as an entry point for cyberattacks. Most adversaries design their attack strategies on systems to gain an advantage at a relatively lower cost, whereas abusive adversaries initiate an attack to inflict maximum damage without regard to cost or reward. In this paper, a sensor spoofing attack is modelled as a malicious adversary attempting to cause system failure by interfering with the feedback control mechanism. It is accomplished by feeding spoofed sensor values to the controller and issuing erroneous commands to the actuator. Experiments on a Simulink‐simulated linear CPS support the proof of concept for the proposed abusive ideology, demonstrating three attack strategies. The impact of the evaluations stresses the importance of testing the CPS security against adversaries with abusive settings for preventing cyber‐vandalism. Finally, the research concludes by highlighting the limitations of the proposed work, followed by recommendations for the future.https://doi.org/10.1049/cit2.12171intelligent systemssecuritysecurity evaluation |
| spellingShingle | Viraj Singh Gaur Vishal Sharma John McAllister Abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber‐physical systems CAAI Transactions on Intelligence Technology intelligent systems security security evaluation |
| title | Abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber‐physical systems |
| title_full | Abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber‐physical systems |
| title_fullStr | Abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber‐physical systems |
| title_full_unstemmed | Abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber‐physical systems |
| title_short | Abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber‐physical systems |
| title_sort | abusive adversarial agents and attack strategies in cyber physical systems |
| topic | intelligent systems security security evaluation |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1049/cit2.12171 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT virajsinghgaur abusiveadversarialagentsandattackstrategiesincyberphysicalsystems AT vishalsharma abusiveadversarialagentsandattackstrategiesincyberphysicalsystems AT johnmcallister abusiveadversarialagentsandattackstrategiesincyberphysicalsystems |