The Taliban in 2024
Reacting to corruption and oppression in the Kandahar of 1994, the Taliban is seen as working with Sunni clerics to foster a shariat movement for advancing economic justice and (corporal) punishment. Before long, the organization began substantially rewarding joiners, arming for jihad, and resisting...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Centre for Security Governance
2014-11-01
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| Series: | Stability : International Journal of Security and Development |
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| Online Access: | http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/334 |
| _version_ | 1818536907043241984 |
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| author | Michael Semple |
| author_facet | Michael Semple |
| author_sort | Michael Semple |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Reacting to corruption and oppression in the Kandahar of 1994, the Taliban is seen as working with Sunni clerics to foster a shariat movement for advancing economic justice and (corporal) punishment. Before long, the organization began substantially rewarding joiners, arming for jihad, and resisting international forces in Afghanistan. Now, with less foreign resources to fight the Taliban, the Kabul central government has unfinished business with its still-robust challengers. In the face of recent modernization in sectors such as education and media, the author details three plausible scenarios for the Taliban to maintain its core shariat mission. One scenario is for the Taliban to re-secure (through continued force) its initial goal, viz., overall state power to promote and enforce shariat across urban as well as rural areas. Another possibility projects Afghanistan as operating a dualist system of separate zones, one for the Taliban's ‘liberated territory,’ the other for the rest of Afghanistan as governed by Kabul. Achieving scenario three would be formidable: it posits that Taliban leaders may be persuaded that their armed jihad has run its course and can profitably be disconnected from the Middle East's broader Islamic conflict. Conceivably, then, through accommodations with a shariat-accepting Kabul government, Taliban might be able to win buy-in for peace from its own military and its own fighting priests with their strong ties to Afghan communities in Pakistan. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-11T18:43:58Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-1e1731f881ac4984aa11240a233e9995 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2165-2627 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-11T18:43:58Z |
| publishDate | 2014-11-01 |
| publisher | Centre for Security Governance |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Stability : International Journal of Security and Development |
| spelling | doaj.art-1e1731f881ac4984aa11240a233e99952022-12-22T00:54:31ZengCentre for Security GovernanceStability : International Journal of Security and Development2165-26272014-11-013110.5334/sta.eh123The Taliban in 2024Michael Semple0Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice, Queen’s University Belfast.Reacting to corruption and oppression in the Kandahar of 1994, the Taliban is seen as working with Sunni clerics to foster a shariat movement for advancing economic justice and (corporal) punishment. Before long, the organization began substantially rewarding joiners, arming for jihad, and resisting international forces in Afghanistan. Now, with less foreign resources to fight the Taliban, the Kabul central government has unfinished business with its still-robust challengers. In the face of recent modernization in sectors such as education and media, the author details three plausible scenarios for the Taliban to maintain its core shariat mission. One scenario is for the Taliban to re-secure (through continued force) its initial goal, viz., overall state power to promote and enforce shariat across urban as well as rural areas. Another possibility projects Afghanistan as operating a dualist system of separate zones, one for the Taliban's ‘liberated territory,’ the other for the rest of Afghanistan as governed by Kabul. Achieving scenario three would be formidable: it posits that Taliban leaders may be persuaded that their armed jihad has run its course and can profitably be disconnected from the Middle East's broader Islamic conflict. Conceivably, then, through accommodations with a shariat-accepting Kabul government, Taliban might be able to win buy-in for peace from its own military and its own fighting priests with their strong ties to Afghan communities in Pakistan.http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/334AfghanistanPakistanTalibanIslam |
| spellingShingle | Michael Semple The Taliban in 2024 Stability : International Journal of Security and Development Afghanistan Pakistan Taliban Islam |
| title | The Taliban in 2024 |
| title_full | The Taliban in 2024 |
| title_fullStr | The Taliban in 2024 |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Taliban in 2024 |
| title_short | The Taliban in 2024 |
| title_sort | taliban in 2024 |
| topic | Afghanistan Pakistan Taliban Islam |
| url | http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/334 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT michaelsemple thetalibanin2024 AT michaelsemple talibanin2024 |