Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical Thinking
According to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Windsor
2005-01-01
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| Series: | Informal Logic |
| Online Access: | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/1041 |
| _version_ | 1819063608660721664 |
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| author | Richard Feldman |
| author_facet | Richard Feldman |
| author_sort | Richard Feldman |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | According to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved not only by one participant rationally coming around to the other's point of view, but also by both of them rationally suspending judgment about the disputed proposition. I also claim that suspension of judgment may be the rational response in the examples Fogelin characterizes as deep disagreements. I deny that this result has any troubling implications for critical thinking. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T15:17:23Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-1e1b85a3be544de7bffa797bccdc7896 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0824-2577 2293-734X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T15:17:23Z |
| publishDate | 2005-01-01 |
| publisher | University of Windsor |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Informal Logic |
| spelling | doaj.art-1e1b85a3be544de7bffa797bccdc78962022-12-21T18:59:07ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25772293-734X2005-01-0125110.22329/il.v25i1.1041Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical ThinkingRichard FeldmanAccording to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved not only by one participant rationally coming around to the other's point of view, but also by both of them rationally suspending judgment about the disputed proposition. I also claim that suspension of judgment may be the rational response in the examples Fogelin characterizes as deep disagreements. I deny that this result has any troubling implications for critical thinking.https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/1041 |
| spellingShingle | Richard Feldman Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical Thinking Informal Logic |
| title | Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical Thinking |
| title_full | Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical Thinking |
| title_fullStr | Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical Thinking |
| title_full_unstemmed | Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical Thinking |
| title_short | Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical Thinking |
| title_sort | deep disagreement rational richard resolutions and critical thinking |
| url | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/1041 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT richardfeldman deepdisagreementrationalrichardresolutionsandcriticalthinking |