R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusion
The purpose of this study is to compare the consequences of, first, quantity leadership, and, second, price leadership competition of duopolists for their R&D investments, within the situation of a cartelized industry. Using game-theoretical approach and numerical analysis, it turns out that...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Faculty of Economics University of Rijeka
2018-12-01
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| Series: | Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.efri.uniri.hr/upload/02-Karbowski-Prokop-2018-2.pdf |
| _version_ | 1811339803898150912 |
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| author | Adam Karbowski Jacek Prokop |
| author_facet | Adam Karbowski Jacek Prokop |
| author_sort | Adam Karbowski |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The purpose of this study is to compare the consequences of, first, quantity
leadership, and, second, price leadership competition of duopolists for their R&D
investments, within the situation of a cartelized industry. Using game-theoretical
approach and numerical analysis, it turns out that under quantity leadership, the
R&D investments of enterprises decline with the increasing knowledge spillovers
in the industry. The relative R&D expenditures of the Stackelberg follower are
lower and they decline significantly faster than the R&D investments of the
Stackelberg leader. Each enterprise supplies the lowest value of the final product
when a research joint venture is formed, which also results in the highest market
price. Under price leadership, a larger extent of knowledge spillovers in the
industry leads to the reduction of R&D expenditures by both enterprises. The
highest price of the final product is set when a research joint venture is formed. In
a cartelized industry, the lowest values of R&D expenditures occur when there are
no knowledge spillovers between enterprises, or when they form a research joint
venture at the R&D stage. The highest values of R&D investments are observed for
the medium values of knowledge spillovers. Performed analysis allows to conclude
that tightening of cooperation in research and development between competitors
creates incentives for them to fully cartelize the market. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T18:32:57Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-1ef17b4255d84a388e10c932e4cc2c0a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1331-8004 1846-7520 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T18:32:57Z |
| publishDate | 2018-12-01 |
| publisher | Faculty of Economics University of Rijeka |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu |
| spelling | doaj.art-1ef17b4255d84a388e10c932e4cc2c0a2022-12-22T02:35:00ZdeuFaculty of Economics University of RijekaZbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu1331-80041846-75202018-12-0136273575310.18045/zbefri.2018.2.735R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusionAdam Karbowski0Jacek Prokop1Warsaw School of Economics, Department of Business EconomicsDepartment of Business EconomicsThe purpose of this study is to compare the consequences of, first, quantity leadership, and, second, price leadership competition of duopolists for their R&D investments, within the situation of a cartelized industry. Using game-theoretical approach and numerical analysis, it turns out that under quantity leadership, the R&D investments of enterprises decline with the increasing knowledge spillovers in the industry. The relative R&D expenditures of the Stackelberg follower are lower and they decline significantly faster than the R&D investments of the Stackelberg leader. Each enterprise supplies the lowest value of the final product when a research joint venture is formed, which also results in the highest market price. Under price leadership, a larger extent of knowledge spillovers in the industry leads to the reduction of R&D expenditures by both enterprises. The highest price of the final product is set when a research joint venture is formed. In a cartelized industry, the lowest values of R&D expenditures occur when there are no knowledge spillovers between enterprises, or when they form a research joint venture at the R&D stage. The highest values of R&D investments are observed for the medium values of knowledge spillovers. Performed analysis allows to conclude that tightening of cooperation in research and development between competitors creates incentives for them to fully cartelize the market.https://www.efri.uniri.hr/upload/02-Karbowski-Prokop-2018-2.pdfR&D cooperationknowledge spilloversincentives to cartelize marketquantity leadershipprice leadership |
| spellingShingle | Adam Karbowski Jacek Prokop R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusion Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci : časopis za ekonomsku teoriju i praksu R&D cooperation knowledge spillovers incentives to cartelize market quantity leadership price leadership |
| title | R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusion |
| title_full | R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusion |
| title_fullStr | R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusion |
| title_full_unstemmed | R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusion |
| title_short | R&D activities of enterprises, product market leadership, and collusion |
| title_sort | r d activities of enterprises product market leadership and collusion |
| topic | R&D cooperation knowledge spillovers incentives to cartelize market quantity leadership price leadership |
| url | https://www.efri.uniri.hr/upload/02-Karbowski-Prokop-2018-2.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT adamkarbowski rdactivitiesofenterprisesproductmarketleadershipandcollusion AT jacekprokop rdactivitiesofenterprisesproductmarketleadershipandcollusion |