Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism

Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Steven Gross, Thitaporn Chaisilprungraung, Elizabeth Kaplan, Jorge Aurelio Menendez, Jonathan Flombaum
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: New Prairie Press 2014-12-01
Series:The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication
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Online Access:http://newprairiepress.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=biyclc
Description
Summary:Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
ISSN:1944-3676