Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping Enforcement
In a dynamic extension of the reciprocal dumping approach, oligopolistic firms producing imperfect substitutes use the carrot and stick strategy to enforce cooperative behavior. When dumping occurs, firms lobby for tariffs as punishment. After a finite punishment period, the non-dumping equilibrium...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Emerald Publishing
2006-05-01
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| Series: | Journal of International Logistics and Trade |
| Online Access: | https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.24006/jilt.2006.4.1.1/full/pdf |
| _version_ | 1797612092541370368 |
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| author | Nilanjan Banik John Gilbert |
| author_facet | Nilanjan Banik John Gilbert |
| author_sort | Nilanjan Banik |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In a dynamic extension of the reciprocal dumping approach, oligopolistic firms producing imperfect substitutes use the carrot and stick strategy to enforce cooperative behavior. When dumping occurs, firms lobby for tariffs as punishment. After a finite punishment period, the non-dumping equilibrium is restored. Conditions are derived on the degrees of substitutability and observability that allow non-dumping under an infinite horizon. The model suggests the degree of substitutability between goods and the market interest rate, affect the likelihood of dumping. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T06:37:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-1fc5944f78cf4da88d154bf33ed47545 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1738-2122 2508-7592 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T06:37:34Z |
| publishDate | 2006-05-01 |
| publisher | Emerald Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of International Logistics and Trade |
| spelling | doaj.art-1fc5944f78cf4da88d154bf33ed475452023-11-17T10:48:37ZengEmerald PublishingJournal of International Logistics and Trade1738-21222508-75922006-05-014111510.24006/jilt.2006.4.1.1Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping EnforcementNilanjan Banik0John Gilbert11Center for Advanced Financial Studies Institute for Financial Management and Research, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India2Department of Economics, Utah State University, USAIn a dynamic extension of the reciprocal dumping approach, oligopolistic firms producing imperfect substitutes use the carrot and stick strategy to enforce cooperative behavior. When dumping occurs, firms lobby for tariffs as punishment. After a finite punishment period, the non-dumping equilibrium is restored. Conditions are derived on the degrees of substitutability and observability that allow non-dumping under an infinite horizon. The model suggests the degree of substitutability between goods and the market interest rate, affect the likelihood of dumping.https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.24006/jilt.2006.4.1.1/full/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Nilanjan Banik John Gilbert Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping Enforcement Journal of International Logistics and Trade |
| title | Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping Enforcement |
| title_full | Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping Enforcement |
| title_fullStr | Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping Enforcement |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping Enforcement |
| title_short | Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping Enforcement |
| title_sort | reciprocal dumping under antidumping enforcement |
| url | https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.24006/jilt.2006.4.1.1/full/pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nilanjanbanik reciprocaldumpingunderantidumpingenforcement AT johngilbert reciprocaldumpingunderantidumpingenforcement |