Research on Brand Competition and Decisions in Supply Chains Under Manufacturer Information Referral
To study the impact of manufacturer information referral on the decision-making of supply chain members, a Stackelberg model is constructed based on a manufacturer, a professional retailer and a store brand retailer. The optimal price and profit of the manufacturer and both retailers when manufactur...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
IEEE
2021-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9524917/ |
| _version_ | 1798003265765376000 |
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| author | Feiyan Han Ling Li Hongyu Lv Herui Wang |
| author_facet | Feiyan Han Ling Li Hongyu Lv Herui Wang |
| author_sort | Feiyan Han |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | To study the impact of manufacturer information referral on the decision-making of supply chain members, a Stackelberg model is constructed based on a manufacturer, a professional retailer and a store brand retailer. The optimal price and profit of the manufacturer and both retailers when manufacturer refers consumers to the professional retailer or not are solved and compared. Besides, the effect of the manufacturer’s information referral on the members of the supply chain is analyzed. The results show that the referral of manufacturer benefits both manufacturer and the referred retailer if the referral level meets certain conditions, otherwise it may reduce the profit of both parties, and the referral level is affected by the market size of the professional retailer. Meanwhile, under the influence of the professional retailer’s market size and the intensity of market competition, the store brand retailer will continue to operate only when the referral level stays in a certain range, but the profit of its store brand is damaged. However, if the referral level exceeds a certain threshold, the store brand product’s profit will increase with free riding. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T12:04:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-20be8d52eda54776a2a087b41a7ebb71 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T12:04:52Z |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-20be8d52eda54776a2a087b41a7ebb712022-12-22T04:24:45ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362021-01-01912141412143010.1109/ACCESS.2021.31089149524917Research on Brand Competition and Decisions in Supply Chains Under Manufacturer Information ReferralFeiyan Han0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5377-3686Ling Li1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6879-2791Hongyu Lv2Herui Wang3Economics and Management Department, Xinzhou Teachers University, Xinzhou, ChinaBusiness School, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin, ChinaCollege of Management and Economic, Tianjin University, Tianjin, ChinaCollege of Management and Economic, Tianjin University, Tianjin, ChinaTo study the impact of manufacturer information referral on the decision-making of supply chain members, a Stackelberg model is constructed based on a manufacturer, a professional retailer and a store brand retailer. The optimal price and profit of the manufacturer and both retailers when manufacturer refers consumers to the professional retailer or not are solved and compared. Besides, the effect of the manufacturer’s information referral on the members of the supply chain is analyzed. The results show that the referral of manufacturer benefits both manufacturer and the referred retailer if the referral level meets certain conditions, otherwise it may reduce the profit of both parties, and the referral level is affected by the market size of the professional retailer. Meanwhile, under the influence of the professional retailer’s market size and the intensity of market competition, the store brand retailer will continue to operate only when the referral level stays in a certain range, but the profit of its store brand is damaged. However, if the referral level exceeds a certain threshold, the store brand product’s profit will increase with free riding.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9524917/Supply chaininformation referral levelbrand competitionStackelberg game |
| spellingShingle | Feiyan Han Ling Li Hongyu Lv Herui Wang Research on Brand Competition and Decisions in Supply Chains Under Manufacturer Information Referral IEEE Access Supply chain information referral level brand competition Stackelberg game |
| title | Research on Brand Competition and Decisions in Supply Chains Under Manufacturer Information Referral |
| title_full | Research on Brand Competition and Decisions in Supply Chains Under Manufacturer Information Referral |
| title_fullStr | Research on Brand Competition and Decisions in Supply Chains Under Manufacturer Information Referral |
| title_full_unstemmed | Research on Brand Competition and Decisions in Supply Chains Under Manufacturer Information Referral |
| title_short | Research on Brand Competition and Decisions in Supply Chains Under Manufacturer Information Referral |
| title_sort | research on brand competition and decisions in supply chains under manufacturer information referral |
| topic | Supply chain information referral level brand competition Stackelberg game |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9524917/ |
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