| Summary: | This paper discusses the development of the Romanian party system in view of the cartel party thesis proposed by Richard Katz and Peter Mair. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I offer a brief review of the cartel party thesis and present a few theoretical arguments regarding the study of cartelization. I argue that Katz and Mair may have overemphasized the importance of cooperation between established parties as necessary for the passing and enactment of cartel related legislation. I hold that the existence of cooperation between established political parties, with or without overt collusion, may be difficult to pinpoint due to the strategic voting that goes on in most legislative bodies. Thus I think it is appropriate to view the passing of the cartel associated legislation as a collective action problem: given high electoral volatility the rules and regulations needed for reducing political uncertainty will be adopted and enacted but not necessarily through cooperation. I suggest that such a perspective can explain every instance when the passing of cartel legislation is dependent on cooperation as well as those instances where no evidence of cooperation can be found. The second section presents some methodological aspects. In the third section I analyze the development of the Romanian party system with emphasis on those electoral rules and regulations that limit open political competition as well as on the system of party finance. I show that electoral rules have gotten progressively harsher and that the system of party finance clearly handicaps new competitors. Moreover the cartel has been extremely successful in keeping new competitors out of Parliament: since the transition from communism to democracy only one genuinely new party has won legislative representation.
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