Hume and the Fiction of Personal Identity
The standard interpretation of Hume’s theory of personal identity usually accepts two important theses: (T1) there is no self or mind endowed with simplicity and perfect identity; (T2) Hume defends a specific metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self or of the mind, according to which it...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia
2014-04-01
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| Series: | Ideas y Valores |
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| Online Access: | http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/31448/44522 |
| Summary: | The standard interpretation of Hume’s theory of personal identity usually accepts two important theses: (T1) there is no self or mind endowed with simplicity and perfect identity; (T2) Hume defends a specific metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self or of the mind, according to which it is only a bundle of perceptions.
The article argues that both of those statements are false. Accepting them would commit Hume to a form of epistemic and metaphysical dogmatism that is incompatible with his experimental philosophy. |
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| ISSN: | 0120-0062 |