Hume and the Fiction of Personal Identity
The standard interpretation of Hume’s theory of personal identity usually accepts two important theses: (T1) there is no self or mind endowed with simplicity and perfect identity; (T2) Hume defends a specific metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self or of the mind, according to which it...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
2014-04-01
|
| Series: | Ideas y Valores |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/31448/44522 |
| _version_ | 1818840957751132160 |
|---|---|
| author | Francisco Pereira Gandarillas |
| author_facet | Francisco Pereira Gandarillas |
| author_sort | Francisco Pereira Gandarillas |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The standard interpretation of Hume’s theory of personal identity usually accepts two important theses: (T1) there is no self or mind endowed with simplicity and perfect identity; (T2) Hume defends a specific metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self or of the mind, according to which it is only a bundle of perceptions.
The article argues that both of those statements are false. Accepting them would commit Hume to a form of epistemic and metaphysical dogmatism that is incompatible with his experimental philosophy. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T04:18:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-20ed7b88813b4ef3a9c64e4281a32c62 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0120-0062 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T04:18:27Z |
| publishDate | 2014-04-01 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ideas y Valores |
| spelling | doaj.art-20ed7b88813b4ef3a9c64e4281a32c622022-12-21T20:36:13ZengUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaIdeas y Valores0120-00622014-04-0163154191213Hume and the Fiction of Personal IdentityFrancisco Pereira Gandarillas0Universidad Alberto Hurtado - ChileThe standard interpretation of Hume’s theory of personal identity usually accepts two important theses: (T1) there is no self or mind endowed with simplicity and perfect identity; (T2) Hume defends a specific metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self or of the mind, according to which it is only a bundle of perceptions. The article argues that both of those statements are false. Accepting them would commit Hume to a form of epistemic and metaphysical dogmatism that is incompatible with his experimental philosophy.http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/31448/44522D. Humepersonal identitymind. |
| spellingShingle | Francisco Pereira Gandarillas Hume and the Fiction of Personal Identity Ideas y Valores D. Hume personal identity mind. |
| title | Hume and the Fiction of Personal Identity |
| title_full | Hume and the Fiction of Personal Identity |
| title_fullStr | Hume and the Fiction of Personal Identity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Hume and the Fiction of Personal Identity |
| title_short | Hume and the Fiction of Personal Identity |
| title_sort | hume and the fiction of personal identity |
| topic | D. Hume personal identity mind. |
| url | http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/31448/44522 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT franciscopereiragandarillas humeandthefictionofpersonalidentity |