the Open-Question Argument, the paradox of analysis, good, intuition, Kripke, Moore.
The open-question argument is a connecting point in contemporary Analytical Ethics, in response to which many new views were addressed as positive or negative reactions to this argument. In this article, we strive to study and critique the open-question argument and its semantic suppositions and to...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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University of Qom
2019-08-01
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Series: | Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī |
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Online Access: | http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1367_40ab71cf4356314ff4ae5f7032e67755.pdf |
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author | Hussein Waleh reza naghavi |
author_facet | Hussein Waleh reza naghavi |
author_sort | Hussein Waleh |
collection | DOAJ |
description | The open-question argument is a connecting point in contemporary Analytical Ethics, in response to which many new views were addressed as positive or negative reactions to this argument. In this article, we strive to study and critique the open-question argument and its semantic suppositions and to show that this argument is an application of paradox of analysis and descriptive theory of meaning on ethical concepts. According to the paradox of analysis, the constituents of things contribute to their concepts and therefore, the real definitions which include the constitutents elements are tautological and lack new information. Going forward, we address the semantic views of Frege, logical positivism, Suhravardi-Locke and Kripke-Putnam in order to resolve the paradox of analysis and show that none of these views can be applied to ethical concepts and cannot be considered as a satisfactory answer to open-argument paradox. Finally, we have explained that another solution can be suggested for the paradox of analysis by taking inspiration from the Kripke-Putnam theory and linguistic inspiration. According to this solution, the primary reference of ethical terms to external instances happens without the mediation of concepts and through common intuitions of the linguistics and the precise concept of these terms is gradually addressed and formed in the process of analysis and by considering primary intuitions |
first_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:14:36Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-20fc0bc2046048ad8a4bc1b58b856004 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1735-9791 2538-2500 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:14:36Z |
publishDate | 2019-08-01 |
publisher | University of Qom |
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series | Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī |
spelling | doaj.art-20fc0bc2046048ad8a4bc1b58b8560042023-09-02T18:56:48ZengUniversity of QomPizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī1735-97912538-25002019-08-01212739510.22091/pfk.2019.3692.19761367the Open-Question Argument, the paradox of analysis, good, intuition, Kripke, Moore.Hussein Waleh0reza naghavi1Assistant professor, Department of philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shahid beheshti University, Tehran, IranPhD student of philosophy of religion, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran (corresponding author)The open-question argument is a connecting point in contemporary Analytical Ethics, in response to which many new views were addressed as positive or negative reactions to this argument. In this article, we strive to study and critique the open-question argument and its semantic suppositions and to show that this argument is an application of paradox of analysis and descriptive theory of meaning on ethical concepts. According to the paradox of analysis, the constituents of things contribute to their concepts and therefore, the real definitions which include the constitutents elements are tautological and lack new information. Going forward, we address the semantic views of Frege, logical positivism, Suhravardi-Locke and Kripke-Putnam in order to resolve the paradox of analysis and show that none of these views can be applied to ethical concepts and cannot be considered as a satisfactory answer to open-argument paradox. Finally, we have explained that another solution can be suggested for the paradox of analysis by taking inspiration from the Kripke-Putnam theory and linguistic inspiration. According to this solution, the primary reference of ethical terms to external instances happens without the mediation of concepts and through common intuitions of the linguistics and the precise concept of these terms is gradually addressed and formed in the process of analysis and by considering primary intuitionshttp://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1367_40ab71cf4356314ff4ae5f7032e67755.pdfopen question argumentparadox of analysisgoodintuitionmoorekripke |
spellingShingle | Hussein Waleh reza naghavi the Open-Question Argument, the paradox of analysis, good, intuition, Kripke, Moore. Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī open question argument paradox of analysis good intuition moore kripke |
title | the Open-Question Argument, the paradox of analysis, good, intuition, Kripke, Moore. |
title_full | the Open-Question Argument, the paradox of analysis, good, intuition, Kripke, Moore. |
title_fullStr | the Open-Question Argument, the paradox of analysis, good, intuition, Kripke, Moore. |
title_full_unstemmed | the Open-Question Argument, the paradox of analysis, good, intuition, Kripke, Moore. |
title_short | the Open-Question Argument, the paradox of analysis, good, intuition, Kripke, Moore. |
title_sort | open question argument the paradox of analysis good intuition kripke moore |
topic | open question argument paradox of analysis good intuition moore kripke |
url | http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1367_40ab71cf4356314ff4ae5f7032e67755.pdf |
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