Structuralism, Empiricism, and Newman's Objection
Newman’s objection can be used to argue that structuralism fails to specify a unique structure for the unobservable world, and hence, one can argue, it is ultimately a trivial task to determine the structure that the world ultimately has. Provided there are enough objects, any structure can be made...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2019-04-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/61571 |
| _version_ | 1818544191766003712 |
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| author | Otávio Bueno Thomas Meier |
| author_facet | Otávio Bueno Thomas Meier |
| author_sort | Otávio Bueno |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Newman’s objection can be used to argue that structuralism fails to specify a unique structure for the unobservable world, and hence, one can argue, it is ultimately a trivial task to determine the structure that the world ultimately has. Provided there are enough objects, any structure can be made compatible with that structure. We formulate a pragmatically enriched version of structuralism that avoids the Newman objection. For this purpose, we return to Carnap’s conception of founded relations, and provide a different interpretation of them. According to Carnap, these are real, experienceable, physical relations. We argue that, when we specify a structural description of a given physical system, if we rely on such founded relations—provided they are properly understood—the threat of the Newman objection is avoided. However, pure structuralism has to be given up, and a form of empiricism can then be advanced. Finally, by using founded relations, we offer a framework in terms of which different conceptions (some realist, some empiricist) can be articulated to avoid the Newman problem as well. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-11T22:45:15Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-21d8fe0b20da43bfb1ed18e1230ecfb9 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-11T22:45:15Z |
| publishDate | 2019-04-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| spelling | doaj.art-21d8fe0b20da43bfb1ed18e1230ecfb92022-12-22T00:47:38ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112019-04-01231536710.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p5332211Structuralism, Empiricism, and Newman's ObjectionOtávio Bueno0Thomas Meier1Department of Philosophy, University of Miami USAMunich Center for Mathematical Philosophy Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich. Ludwigstrasse 31, 80539, GermanyNewman’s objection can be used to argue that structuralism fails to specify a unique structure for the unobservable world, and hence, one can argue, it is ultimately a trivial task to determine the structure that the world ultimately has. Provided there are enough objects, any structure can be made compatible with that structure. We formulate a pragmatically enriched version of structuralism that avoids the Newman objection. For this purpose, we return to Carnap’s conception of founded relations, and provide a different interpretation of them. According to Carnap, these are real, experienceable, physical relations. We argue that, when we specify a structural description of a given physical system, if we rely on such founded relations—provided they are properly understood—the threat of the Newman objection is avoided. However, pure structuralism has to be given up, and a form of empiricism can then be advanced. Finally, by using founded relations, we offer a framework in terms of which different conceptions (some realist, some empiricist) can be articulated to avoid the Newman problem as well.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/61571newman objectionstructuralismstructural realismempiricismfounded relationssemantic conception |
| spellingShingle | Otávio Bueno Thomas Meier Structuralism, Empiricism, and Newman's Objection Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology newman objection structuralism structural realism empiricism founded relations semantic conception |
| title | Structuralism, Empiricism, and Newman's Objection |
| title_full | Structuralism, Empiricism, and Newman's Objection |
| title_fullStr | Structuralism, Empiricism, and Newman's Objection |
| title_full_unstemmed | Structuralism, Empiricism, and Newman's Objection |
| title_short | Structuralism, Empiricism, and Newman's Objection |
| title_sort | structuralism empiricism and newman s objection |
| topic | newman objection structuralism structural realism empiricism founded relations semantic conception |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/61571 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT otaviobueno structuralismempiricismandnewmansobjection AT thomasmeier structuralismempiricismandnewmansobjection |