Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation
With development of industrial aggregation, the industrial park energy operator (IPEO) offers energy supply services to factories with varying energy consumption requirements. Nevertheless, the unified energy pricing model is not conducive to the park operator's ability to attain a justifiable...
Main Authors: | , , , , , |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier
2023-11-01
|
Series: | Energy Reports |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484723014646 |
_version_ | 1797378658183151616 |
---|---|
author | Yifei Ning Chen Yu Xin Zhang Zhihui Tang Huang Huang Yunzhe Qian |
author_facet | Yifei Ning Chen Yu Xin Zhang Zhihui Tang Huang Huang Yunzhe Qian |
author_sort | Yifei Ning |
collection | DOAJ |
description | With development of industrial aggregation, the industrial park energy operator (IPEO) offers energy supply services to factories with varying energy consumption requirements. Nevertheless, the unified energy pricing model is not conducive to the park operator's ability to attain a justifiable recuperation of energy supply expenses. To address these issues, a differential pricing strategy for the potential game of IPEO is proposed in this paper to achieve clean and efficient operation of industrial electric-heat energy systems (EHES). Firstly, a mechanism for allocating public losses is established in the pricing process, and the power loss of the network is precisely allocated to the user side using the complex power tracking method. Second, a potential game model for IPEO and its users is established based on the different interests of the participants. IPEO releases energy prices to users by maximizing energy sales as a profit function and considering the output of energy production facilities and purchased electricity. The user minimizes the cost of energy by considering the profit function, which takes into account the energy storage discharge and flexible load adjustment. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the proposed model are verified by comparing several cases. The simulation results show that the proposed model can fully consider the autonomy of the game participants and effectively enhance the benefits of each participant. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-08T20:09:49Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-21e1a8300923451ab2b4bb75fd4b1e68 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2352-4847 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-08T20:09:49Z |
publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
publisher | Elsevier |
record_format | Article |
series | Energy Reports |
spelling | doaj.art-21e1a8300923451ab2b4bb75fd4b1e682023-12-23T05:21:57ZengElsevierEnergy Reports2352-48472023-11-011036393651Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocationYifei Ning0Chen Yu1Xin Zhang2Zhihui Tang3Huang Huang4Yunzhe Qian5Nanjing Power Supply Corporation, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China; College of Energy and Electrical Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China; Corresponding author at: Nanjing Power Supply Corporation, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China.Nanjing Power Supply Corporation, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company, Nanjing, Jiangsu, ChinaNanjing Power Supply Corporation, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company, Nanjing, Jiangsu, ChinaNanjing Power Supply Corporation, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company, Nanjing, Jiangsu, ChinaNanjing Power Supply Corporation, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company, Nanjing, Jiangsu, ChinaNanjing Power Supply Corporation, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company, Nanjing, Jiangsu, ChinaWith development of industrial aggregation, the industrial park energy operator (IPEO) offers energy supply services to factories with varying energy consumption requirements. Nevertheless, the unified energy pricing model is not conducive to the park operator's ability to attain a justifiable recuperation of energy supply expenses. To address these issues, a differential pricing strategy for the potential game of IPEO is proposed in this paper to achieve clean and efficient operation of industrial electric-heat energy systems (EHES). Firstly, a mechanism for allocating public losses is established in the pricing process, and the power loss of the network is precisely allocated to the user side using the complex power tracking method. Second, a potential game model for IPEO and its users is established based on the different interests of the participants. IPEO releases energy prices to users by maximizing energy sales as a profit function and considering the output of energy production facilities and purchased electricity. The user minimizes the cost of energy by considering the profit function, which takes into account the energy storage discharge and flexible load adjustment. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the proposed model are verified by comparing several cases. The simulation results show that the proposed model can fully consider the autonomy of the game participants and effectively enhance the benefits of each participant.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484723014646Industrial park energy operator 1Potential game 2Loss allocation 3Differential pricing 4Electric-heat energy system 5 |
spellingShingle | Yifei Ning Chen Yu Xin Zhang Zhihui Tang Huang Huang Yunzhe Qian Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation Energy Reports Industrial park energy operator 1 Potential game 2 Loss allocation 3 Differential pricing 4 Electric-heat energy system 5 |
title | Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation |
title_full | Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation |
title_fullStr | Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation |
title_full_unstemmed | Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation |
title_short | Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation |
title_sort | differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation |
topic | Industrial park energy operator 1 Potential game 2 Loss allocation 3 Differential pricing 4 Electric-heat energy system 5 |
url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484723014646 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT yifeining differentialenergypricingofindustrialparkoperatorbasedonpotentialgameconsideringpubliclossallocation AT chenyu differentialenergypricingofindustrialparkoperatorbasedonpotentialgameconsideringpubliclossallocation AT xinzhang differentialenergypricingofindustrialparkoperatorbasedonpotentialgameconsideringpubliclossallocation AT zhihuitang differentialenergypricingofindustrialparkoperatorbasedonpotentialgameconsideringpubliclossallocation AT huanghuang differentialenergypricingofindustrialparkoperatorbasedonpotentialgameconsideringpubliclossallocation AT yunzheqian differentialenergypricingofindustrialparkoperatorbasedonpotentialgameconsideringpubliclossallocation |