Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas
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| Series: | Manuscrito |
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000300005&lng=en&tlng=en |
| _version_ | 1818050744111071232 |
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| author | Giovanni Rolla |
| author_facet | Giovanni Rolla |
| author_sort | Giovanni Rolla |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-10T10:58:20Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-22104f4085884844909588e28e29872c |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2317-630X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-10T10:58:20Z |
| publisher | Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Manuscrito |
| spelling | doaj.art-22104f4085884844909588e28e29872c2022-12-22T01:51:45ZengUniversidade Estadual de CampinasManuscrito2317-630X39352810.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n3.grS0100-60452016000300005Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied RationalityGiovanni RollaABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario.http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000300005&lng=en&tlng=enDisjunctivismDream SkepticismRationalityActionism |
| spellingShingle | Giovanni Rolla Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality Manuscrito Disjunctivism Dream Skepticism Rationality Actionism |
| title | Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality |
| title_full | Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality |
| title_fullStr | Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality |
| title_short | Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality |
| title_sort | epistemic immodesty and embodied rationality |
| topic | Disjunctivism Dream Skepticism Rationality Actionism |
| url | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000300005&lng=en&tlng=en |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT giovannirolla epistemicimmodestyandembodiedrationality |