Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual. This phenomenon seems to show that there can be a difference in the phenomen...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016-11-01
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| Series: | Phenomenology and Mind |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7117 |
| _version_ | 1818367073133264896 |
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| author | Arianna Uggé |
| author_facet | Arianna Uggé |
| author_sort | Arianna Uggé |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual. This phenomenon seems to show that there can be a difference in the phenomenal character of two visual experiences, without a difference in their representational nonconceptual content. Firstly, I shall try to illustrate that these “representationalist” theories cannot provide a compelling explanation for the phenomenon of ambiguous figures. Secondly, I will present an account of it grounded on Peacocke’s “dual nonconceptual content” view. The distinction he draws between two levels of nonconceptual content can be used to explain the phenomenon without abandoning the thesis that the phenomenal character of our visual experience is a representational wholly nonconceptual content. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-13T22:46:15Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-237475f5edcb47bc81ea93a525a04535 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2280-7853 2239-4028 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-13T22:46:15Z |
| publishDate | 2016-11-01 |
| publisher | Rosenberg & Sellier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Phenomenology and Mind |
| spelling | doaj.art-237475f5edcb47bc81ea93a525a045352022-12-21T23:28:44ZengRosenberg & SellierPhenomenology and Mind2280-78532239-40282016-11-01410.13128/Phe_Mi-1959816417Representationalism and Ambiguous FiguresArianna UggéThe phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual. This phenomenon seems to show that there can be a difference in the phenomenal character of two visual experiences, without a difference in their representational nonconceptual content. Firstly, I shall try to illustrate that these “representationalist” theories cannot provide a compelling explanation for the phenomenon of ambiguous figures. Secondly, I will present an account of it grounded on Peacocke’s “dual nonconceptual content” view. The distinction he draws between two levels of nonconceptual content can be used to explain the phenomenon without abandoning the thesis that the phenomenal character of our visual experience is a representational wholly nonconceptual content.https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7117representationalismambiguous figuresvisual experience |
| spellingShingle | Arianna Uggé Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures Phenomenology and Mind representationalism ambiguous figures visual experience |
| title | Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures |
| title_full | Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures |
| title_fullStr | Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures |
| title_full_unstemmed | Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures |
| title_short | Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures |
| title_sort | representationalism and ambiguous figures |
| topic | representationalism ambiguous figures visual experience |
| url | https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7117 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ariannaugge representationalismandambiguousfigures |