A Discretionary Case for Preservationism about Free Will

How does the term ‘free will’ refer? This question seems to lie at the center of debates about whether the attitudes and practices that depend on our successful attributions of basic-desert-entailing moral responsibility ought to be preserved or eliminated. In this paper I tackle questions about th...

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Main Author: Kelly McCormick
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente 2022-12-01
Series:Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/407
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author Kelly McCormick
author_facet Kelly McCormick
author_sort Kelly McCormick
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description How does the term ‘free will’ refer? This question seems to lie at the center of debates about whether the attitudes and practices that depend on our successful attributions of basic-desert-entailing moral responsibility ought to be preserved or eliminated. In this paper I tackle questions about the way that different reference-fixing conventions might inform disagreement between preservationists and eliminativists about free will and moral responsibility, and argue that even recent elimination-friendly work on reference fails to offer much real support for eliminativism. In fact, making explicit the role that different motivating concerns play in rendering certain reference-fixing conventions operative for eliminativists and preservationists suggests at least one powerful reference-based argument in favor of preservationism.
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spelling doaj.art-23c7da6a77cd4dfba13d918f8a18c3a82022-12-28T14:59:57ZengAssociazione Culturale Humana.MenteHumana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies1972-12932022-12-011542A Discretionary Case for Preservationism about Free WillKelly McCormick0Texas Christian University How does the term ‘free will’ refer? This question seems to lie at the center of debates about whether the attitudes and practices that depend on our successful attributions of basic-desert-entailing moral responsibility ought to be preserved or eliminated. In this paper I tackle questions about the way that different reference-fixing conventions might inform disagreement between preservationists and eliminativists about free will and moral responsibility, and argue that even recent elimination-friendly work on reference fails to offer much real support for eliminativism. In fact, making explicit the role that different motivating concerns play in rendering certain reference-fixing conventions operative for eliminativists and preservationists suggests at least one powerful reference-based argument in favor of preservationism. https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/407Free WillEliminativismPreservationism
spellingShingle Kelly McCormick
A Discretionary Case for Preservationism about Free Will
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies
Free Will
Eliminativism
Preservationism
title A Discretionary Case for Preservationism about Free Will
title_full A Discretionary Case for Preservationism about Free Will
title_fullStr A Discretionary Case for Preservationism about Free Will
title_full_unstemmed A Discretionary Case for Preservationism about Free Will
title_short A Discretionary Case for Preservationism about Free Will
title_sort discretionary case for preservationism about free will
topic Free Will
Eliminativism
Preservationism
url https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/407
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