Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses
Although in everyday life decisions about losses are prevalent (e.g., the climate crisis and the COVID-19 crisis), there is hardly any research on decisions in the loss domain. Therefore, we conducted online experiments with a sample of 672 participants (mostly students), using third-party punishmen...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Behavioral Sciences |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-328X/14/1/39 |
| _version_ | 1797344599231954944 |
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| author | Ivo Windrich Sabrina Kierspel Thomas Neumann Roger Berger Bodo Vogt |
| author_facet | Ivo Windrich Sabrina Kierspel Thomas Neumann Roger Berger Bodo Vogt |
| author_sort | Ivo Windrich |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Although in everyday life decisions about losses are prevalent (e.g., the climate crisis and the COVID-19 crisis), there is hardly any research on decisions in the loss domain. Therefore, we conducted online experiments with a sample of 672 participants (mostly students), using third-party punishment dictator games (DGs) in the loss domain to explore the impact of losses and punishment threats on the conformity to the fairness norm. Subjects in the treatment condition have to divide a loss of −10 € with the threat of a third-party punishment with different strengths (control: gains, no punishment). Overall, the statistical evidence seems rather weak, but when it comes to losses, subjects are more rational and straightforward with their words and deeds than with gains. Therefore, in the loss domain, subjects are more likely to believe that the fairness norm should be followed, and they subjectively perceive that the others do as well. Furthermore, although dictators’ decisions are more selfish in the loss domain, dictators there react more strongly to the punishment threat by reducing their demands than in the gains domain. This holds as long as the punishment threat is strong enough, as judged from a rational perspective. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T11:05:03Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-23f62bf659c745f2881b99f6dd62bcb0 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2076-328X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T11:05:03Z |
| publishDate | 2024-01-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Behavioral Sciences |
| spelling | doaj.art-23f62bf659c745f2881b99f6dd62bcb02024-01-26T15:05:51ZengMDPI AGBehavioral Sciences2076-328X2024-01-011413910.3390/bs14010039Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and LossesIvo Windrich0Sabrina Kierspel1Thomas Neumann2Roger Berger3Bodo Vogt4Institute of Sociology, University of Leipzig, 04107 Leipzig, GermanyEmpirical Economics, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, 39106 Magdeburg, GermanyEmpirical Economics, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, 39106 Magdeburg, GermanyInstitute of Sociology, University of Leipzig, 04107 Leipzig, GermanyEmpirical Economics, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, 39106 Magdeburg, GermanyAlthough in everyday life decisions about losses are prevalent (e.g., the climate crisis and the COVID-19 crisis), there is hardly any research on decisions in the loss domain. Therefore, we conducted online experiments with a sample of 672 participants (mostly students), using third-party punishment dictator games (DGs) in the loss domain to explore the impact of losses and punishment threats on the conformity to the fairness norm. Subjects in the treatment condition have to divide a loss of −10 € with the threat of a third-party punishment with different strengths (control: gains, no punishment). Overall, the statistical evidence seems rather weak, but when it comes to losses, subjects are more rational and straightforward with their words and deeds than with gains. Therefore, in the loss domain, subjects are more likely to believe that the fairness norm should be followed, and they subjectively perceive that the others do as well. Furthermore, although dictators’ decisions are more selfish in the loss domain, dictators there react more strongly to the punishment threat by reducing their demands than in the gains domain. This holds as long as the punishment threat is strong enough, as judged from a rational perspective.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-328X/14/1/39fairnesssocial normspunishmentdictator gamethird-party-punishment gameloss domain |
| spellingShingle | Ivo Windrich Sabrina Kierspel Thomas Neumann Roger Berger Bodo Vogt Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses Behavioral Sciences fairness social norms punishment dictator game third-party-punishment game loss domain |
| title | Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses |
| title_full | Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses |
| title_fullStr | Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses |
| title_full_unstemmed | Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses |
| title_short | Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses |
| title_sort | enforcement of fairness norms by punishment a comparison of gains and losses |
| topic | fairness social norms punishment dictator game third-party-punishment game loss domain |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-328X/14/1/39 |
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