Kantian–Nashian interaction and petty tax corruption in developing countries

Purpose – This paper attempts to develop a simple, static model of tax administration that is capable of explaining the widespread collusive petty tax administration corruption observed in developing countries. Design/methodology/approach – This paper utilizes a positivist research framework and ado...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Binh Tran-Nam
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Emerald Publishing 2023-12-01
Series:Fulbright Review of Economics and Policy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/FREP-05-2023-0018/full/pdf
Description
Summary:Purpose – This paper attempts to develop a simple, static model of tax administration that is capable of explaining the widespread collusive petty tax administration corruption observed in developing countries. Design/methodology/approach – This paper utilizes a positivist research framework and adopts a theoretical method of analysis, although secondary data will also be mentioned to support theoretical arguments whenever it is appropriate to do so. Findings – A high rate of collusive tax corruption is inevitable in developing countries. Research limitations/implications – The model is static and needs to be extended into a dynamic model. Practical implications – Traditional enforcement tools such as higher audits or a higher penalty regime against tax evasion do not work. Tax simplification can lessen the incidence of tax corruption. Social implications – Fighting tax corruption requires significant changes in the attitudes of taxpayers and tax auditors. Originality/value – This paper combines the literature on Kantian economics and tax compliance in an innovative fashion.
ISSN:2635-0173
2635-0181