Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’

This paper discusses Leibniz’s treatment of the term ‘nihil’ that appears in some logical papers about the notion of Real Addition. First, the paper argues that the term should be understood as an empty (singular) term and that sentences with empty terms can be true (§2). Second, it sketches a po...

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Main Author: Costantini, Filippo
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari 2021-12-01
Series:JoLMA
Subjects:
Online Access:http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2021/02/001
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author Costantini, Filippo
author_facet Costantini, Filippo
author_sort Costantini, Filippo
collection DOAJ
description This paper discusses Leibniz’s treatment of the term ‘nihil’ that appears in some logical papers about the notion of Real Addition. First, the paper argues that the term should be understood as an empty (singular) term and that sentences with empty terms can be true (§2). Second, it sketches a positive free logic to describe the logical behaviour of empty terms (§3). After explaining how this approach avoids a contradiction that threatens the introduction of the term ‘nihil’ in the Real Addition calculus (§4), and how this approach should be understood within Leibniz’s philosophy (§5), the paper assesses the prospects of such an approach with regard to two fundamental issues in Leibniz’s thought: the fictional nature of infinitesimals (§6), and the occurrence of the term ‘nothing’ in the proof of the existence of God that we find in the New Essays (§7).
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spelling doaj.art-298c75b82ffa415a8492f257386e9e4a2023-11-24T09:10:09ZengFondazione Università Ca’ FoscariJoLMA2723-96402021-12-012210.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2021/02/001journal_article_6191Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’Costantini, Filippo0Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia This paper discusses Leibniz’s treatment of the term ‘nihil’ that appears in some logical papers about the notion of Real Addition. First, the paper argues that the term should be understood as an empty (singular) term and that sentences with empty terms can be true (§2). Second, it sketches a positive free logic to describe the logical behaviour of empty terms (§3). After explaining how this approach avoids a contradiction that threatens the introduction of the term ‘nihil’ in the Real Addition calculus (§4), and how this approach should be understood within Leibniz’s philosophy (§5), the paper assesses the prospects of such an approach with regard to two fundamental issues in Leibniz’s thought: the fictional nature of infinitesimals (§6), and the occurrence of the term ‘nothing’ in the proof of the existence of God that we find in the New Essays (§7). http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2021/02/001Empty terms. Leibniz. Mereology. Nothingness. Positive Free Logic. Real Addition
spellingShingle Costantini, Filippo
Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’
JoLMA
Empty terms. Leibniz. Mereology. Nothingness. Positive Free Logic. Real Addition
title Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’
title_full Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’
title_fullStr Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’
title_full_unstemmed Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’
title_short Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’
title_sort leibniz on the empty term nothing
topic Empty terms. Leibniz. Mereology. Nothingness. Positive Free Logic. Real Addition
url http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2021/02/001
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