Existence does not Have any Extension: Sohrawardi\'s Theory about Existence not Having any Real Extension and its Usage in the Realm of the Necessary Being through Itself
Theories about the dawn of "principality of existence" or "principality of quiddity" stand in the realm of "confusion of term and concept fallacy". It is true that asalat as a term appeared for the first time in Mirdamad's works such as Taqwim al-Iman to mention th...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
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University of Isfahan
2012-03-01
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| Series: | Metaphysics |
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| Online Access: | http://uijs.ui.ac.ir/mph/browse.php?a_code=A-10-1-36&slc_lang=en&sid=1 |
| Summary: | Theories about the dawn of "principality of existence" or "principality of quiddity" stand in the realm of "confusion of term and concept fallacy". It is true that asalat as a term appeared for the first time in Mirdamad's works such as Taqwim al-Iman to mention the problem of principality of existence, but we should notice that its meaning as a concept can be tracked in Suhrawadi's works. If by the term asalat we mean having real extension, as it is used in Mulla Sadra's work, we can, without any doubt, claim that Suhrawardi is among the proponents of principality of quiddity. Proposing the distinction of existence and quiddity by al-Faraby and Avicenna, some philosophers regarded this distinction as a real one. But Suhrawardi, by presenting about nine arguments, claimed that existence remains as a mental predicate and does not have any real extension. He made use of his theory in the realm of the Necessary Being through Itself. Avicenna had claimed that the essence of God is His Existence (al-Haqq mahiyyatuh inniyyatuh) but Suhrawardi denied this Avicennan Peripatetic principle. He said that existence has no real extension and so the essence of God cannot be existence. He claimed that here iniyyah means indivisible life (al-Hayat al-Basit). It seems that Mulla Sadra's arguments for demonstrating the principality of existence posed versus Suhrawardi's arguments for the mental nature of existence. |
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| ISSN: | 2008-8086 2476-3276 |