Controlled Islanding under Complete and Partial False Data Injection Attack Uncertainties against Phasor Measurement Units
The widespread application of phasor measurement units has improved grid operational reliability. However, this has increased the risk of cyber threats such as false data injection attack that mislead time-critical measurements, which may lead to incorrect operator actions. While a single incorrect...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2022-08-01
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| Series: | Energies |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/15/15/5723 |
| _version_ | 1797413963254726656 |
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| author | Sagnik Basumallik Sara Eftekharnejad Makan Fardad |
| author_facet | Sagnik Basumallik Sara Eftekharnejad Makan Fardad |
| author_sort | Sagnik Basumallik |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The widespread application of phasor measurement units has improved grid operational reliability. However, this has increased the risk of cyber threats such as false data injection attack that mislead time-critical measurements, which may lead to incorrect operator actions. While a single incorrect operator action might not result in a cascading failure, a series of actions impacting critical lines and transformers, combined with pre-existing faults or scheduled maintenance, might lead to widespread outages. To prevent cascading failures, controlled islanding strategies are traditionally implemented. However, islanding is effective only when the received data are trustworthy. This paper investigates two multi-objective controlled islanding strategies to accommodate data uncertainties under scenarios of lack of or partial knowledge of false data injection attacks. When attack information is not available, the optimization problem maximizes island observability using a minimum number of phasor measurement units for a more accurate state estimation. When partial attack information is available, vulnerable phasor measurement units are isolated to a smaller island to minimize the impacts of attacks. Additional objectives ensure steady-state and transient-state stability of the islands. Simulations are performed on 200-bus, 500-bus, and 2000-bus systems. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T05:26:01Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-2c111bb21282483c84c4c09be1370184 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1996-1073 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T05:26:01Z |
| publishDate | 2022-08-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Energies |
| spelling | doaj.art-2c111bb21282483c84c4c09be13701842023-12-03T12:36:36ZengMDPI AGEnergies1996-10732022-08-011515572310.3390/en15155723Controlled Islanding under Complete and Partial False Data Injection Attack Uncertainties against Phasor Measurement UnitsSagnik Basumallik0Sara Eftekharnejad1Makan Fardad2Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506, USADepartment of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210, USADepartment of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210, USAThe widespread application of phasor measurement units has improved grid operational reliability. However, this has increased the risk of cyber threats such as false data injection attack that mislead time-critical measurements, which may lead to incorrect operator actions. While a single incorrect operator action might not result in a cascading failure, a series of actions impacting critical lines and transformers, combined with pre-existing faults or scheduled maintenance, might lead to widespread outages. To prevent cascading failures, controlled islanding strategies are traditionally implemented. However, islanding is effective only when the received data are trustworthy. This paper investigates two multi-objective controlled islanding strategies to accommodate data uncertainties under scenarios of lack of or partial knowledge of false data injection attacks. When attack information is not available, the optimization problem maximizes island observability using a minimum number of phasor measurement units for a more accurate state estimation. When partial attack information is available, vulnerable phasor measurement units are isolated to a smaller island to minimize the impacts of attacks. Additional objectives ensure steady-state and transient-state stability of the islands. Simulations are performed on 200-bus, 500-bus, and 2000-bus systems.https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/15/15/5723controlled islandingcyber securityemergency controlfalse data attackwide-area control and stabilityphasor measurement units |
| spellingShingle | Sagnik Basumallik Sara Eftekharnejad Makan Fardad Controlled Islanding under Complete and Partial False Data Injection Attack Uncertainties against Phasor Measurement Units Energies controlled islanding cyber security emergency control false data attack wide-area control and stability phasor measurement units |
| title | Controlled Islanding under Complete and Partial False Data Injection Attack Uncertainties against Phasor Measurement Units |
| title_full | Controlled Islanding under Complete and Partial False Data Injection Attack Uncertainties against Phasor Measurement Units |
| title_fullStr | Controlled Islanding under Complete and Partial False Data Injection Attack Uncertainties against Phasor Measurement Units |
| title_full_unstemmed | Controlled Islanding under Complete and Partial False Data Injection Attack Uncertainties against Phasor Measurement Units |
| title_short | Controlled Islanding under Complete and Partial False Data Injection Attack Uncertainties against Phasor Measurement Units |
| title_sort | controlled islanding under complete and partial false data injection attack uncertainties against phasor measurement units |
| topic | controlled islanding cyber security emergency control false data attack wide-area control and stability phasor measurement units |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/15/15/5723 |
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