Driver-Pedestrian Interactions at Unsignalized Crossings Are Not in Line With the Nash Equilibrium
Recent developments in vehicle automation require simulations of human-robot interactions in the road traffic context, which can be achieved by computational models of human behavior such as game theory. Game theory provides a good insight into road user behavior by considering agents’ in...
Main Authors: | Amir Hossein Kalantari, Yue Yang, Yee Mun Lee, Natasha Merat, Gustav Markkula |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
IEEE
2023-01-01
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Series: | IEEE Access |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10273987/ |
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