How voluntary control over information and body movements determines “what it’s like” to have perceptual, bodily, emotional and mental experiences
Two very fundamental aspects of phenomenal experiences underline the fact that they seem to have “something it’s like.” One aspect is the fact that experiences have a locus: they Can seem “external” (perceptual), “internal” (interoceptive, bodily or emotional) or “mental.” A second fundamental aspec...
Main Author: | J. Kevin O'Regan |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2023-01-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1108279/full |
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