Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk
Zoonotic influenza infections continue to threaten human health. Ongoing surveillance and risk assessment of animal viruses are needed for pandemic preparedness, and population immunity is an important component of risk assessment. We determined age-stratified hemagglutinin inhibition seroprevalenc...
Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2022-05-01
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Series: | Emerging Infectious Diseases |
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Online Access: | https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/28/5/21-1965_article |
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author | Jonathan Tin Lai Cheung Tim K. Tsang Hui-ling Yen Ranawaka A.P.M. Perera Chris Ka Pun Mok Yong Ping Lin Benjamin J. Cowling Malik Peiris |
author_facet | Jonathan Tin Lai Cheung Tim K. Tsang Hui-ling Yen Ranawaka A.P.M. Perera Chris Ka Pun Mok Yong Ping Lin Benjamin J. Cowling Malik Peiris |
author_sort | Jonathan Tin Lai Cheung |
collection | DOAJ |
description |
Zoonotic influenza infections continue to threaten human health. Ongoing surveillance and risk assessment of animal viruses are needed for pandemic preparedness, and population immunity is an important component of risk assessment. We determined age-stratified hemagglutinin inhibition seroprevalence against 5 swine influenza viruses circulating in Hong Kong and Guangzhou in China. Using hemagglutinin inhibition seroprevalence and titers, we modeled the effect of population immunity on the basic reproduction number (R0) if each virus were to become transmissible among humans. Among 353 individual serum samples, we reported low seroprevalence for triple-reassortant H1N2 and Eurasian avian-like H1N1 influenza viruses, which would reduce R0 by only 18%–20%. The smallest R0 needed to cause a pandemic was 1.22–1.24, meaning existing population immunity would be insufficient to block the spread of these H1N1 or H1N2 variants. For human-origin H3N2, existing population immunity could suppress R0 by 47%, thus reducing pandemic risk.
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first_indexed | 2024-04-13T16:00:31Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-2da4d57d4fa34678b0ca07a2bde4ba48 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1080-6040 1080-6059 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-13T16:00:31Z |
publishDate | 2022-05-01 |
publisher | Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |
record_format | Article |
series | Emerging Infectious Diseases |
spelling | doaj.art-2da4d57d4fa34678b0ca07a2bde4ba482022-12-22T02:40:34ZengCenters for Disease Control and PreventionEmerging Infectious Diseases1080-60401080-60592022-05-0128597798510.3201/eid2805.211965Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic RiskJonathan Tin Lai CheungTim K. TsangHui-ling YenRanawaka A.P.M. PereraChris Ka Pun MokYong Ping LinBenjamin J. CowlingMalik Peiris Zoonotic influenza infections continue to threaten human health. Ongoing surveillance and risk assessment of animal viruses are needed for pandemic preparedness, and population immunity is an important component of risk assessment. We determined age-stratified hemagglutinin inhibition seroprevalence against 5 swine influenza viruses circulating in Hong Kong and Guangzhou in China. Using hemagglutinin inhibition seroprevalence and titers, we modeled the effect of population immunity on the basic reproduction number (R0) if each virus were to become transmissible among humans. Among 353 individual serum samples, we reported low seroprevalence for triple-reassortant H1N2 and Eurasian avian-like H1N1 influenza viruses, which would reduce R0 by only 18%–20%. The smallest R0 needed to cause a pandemic was 1.22–1.24, meaning existing population immunity would be insufficient to block the spread of these H1N1 or H1N2 variants. For human-origin H3N2, existing population immunity could suppress R0 by 47%, thus reducing pandemic risk. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/28/5/21-1965_articleinfluenzaswine flupandemicsrisk assessmentseroprevalencehemagglutinin |
spellingShingle | Jonathan Tin Lai Cheung Tim K. Tsang Hui-ling Yen Ranawaka A.P.M. Perera Chris Ka Pun Mok Yong Ping Lin Benjamin J. Cowling Malik Peiris Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk Emerging Infectious Diseases influenza swine flu pandemics risk assessment seroprevalence hemagglutinin |
title | Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk |
title_full | Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk |
title_fullStr | Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk |
title_full_unstemmed | Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk |
title_short | Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk |
title_sort | determining existing human population immunity as part of assessing influenza pandemic risk |
topic | influenza swine flu pandemics risk assessment seroprevalence hemagglutinin |
url | https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/28/5/21-1965_article |
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