When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions
In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1306023/full |
| _version_ | 1827632483466739712 |
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| author | Marius Usher Marius Usher Niccolò Negro Niccolò Negro Hilla Jacobson Hilla Jacobson Naotsugu Tsuchiya Naotsugu Tsuchiya |
| author_facet | Marius Usher Marius Usher Niccolò Negro Niccolò Negro Hilla Jacobson Hilla Jacobson Naotsugu Tsuchiya Naotsugu Tsuchiya |
| author_sort | Marius Usher |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should reject the methodology for consciousness science that the UA prescribes. First, we briefly survey the most popular philosophical positions in consciousness science, namely physicalism and functionalism. We discuss the relations between these positions and the behaviorist methodology that the UA assumptions express, despite the contrary claim of its proponents. Second, we argue that the same reasoning that the UA applies against causal structure theories can be applied to functionalist approaches, thus proving too much and deeming as unscientific a whole range of (non-causal structure) theories. Since this is overly restrictive and fits poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that the reasoning of the UA must be flawed. Third, we assess its philosophical assumptions, which express a restrictive methodology, and conclude that there are reasons to reject them. Finally, we propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science, that includes neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence (provided by the first-person perspective) without which consciousness science could not even start. Then, we extend this discussion to the scope of consciousness science, and conclude that theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, and not on systems considerably different from us. Rather than restricting the methodology of consciousness science, we should, at this point, restrict the range of systems upon which it is supposed to be built. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T14:45:12Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-2e0cea45b14a4d46a11eac73755938c8 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1664-1078 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T14:45:12Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Psychology |
| spelling | doaj.art-2e0cea45b14a4d46a11eac73755938c82023-11-27T06:57:42ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782023-11-011410.3389/fpsyg.2023.13060231306023When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptionsMarius Usher0Marius Usher1Niccolò Negro2Niccolò Negro3Hilla Jacobson4Hilla Jacobson5Naotsugu Tsuchiya6Naotsugu Tsuchiya7School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, IsraelSagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, IsraelSchool of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, IsraelMonash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, AustraliaDepartment of Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, IsraelDepartment of Philosophy, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IsraelFaculty of Medicine, Nursing, and Health Sciences, School of Psychological Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, AustraliaLaboratory of Qualia Structure, ATR Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto, JapanIn this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should reject the methodology for consciousness science that the UA prescribes. First, we briefly survey the most popular philosophical positions in consciousness science, namely physicalism and functionalism. We discuss the relations between these positions and the behaviorist methodology that the UA assumptions express, despite the contrary claim of its proponents. Second, we argue that the same reasoning that the UA applies against causal structure theories can be applied to functionalist approaches, thus proving too much and deeming as unscientific a whole range of (non-causal structure) theories. Since this is overly restrictive and fits poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that the reasoning of the UA must be flawed. Third, we assess its philosophical assumptions, which express a restrictive methodology, and conclude that there are reasons to reject them. Finally, we propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science, that includes neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence (provided by the first-person perspective) without which consciousness science could not even start. Then, we extend this discussion to the scope of consciousness science, and conclude that theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, and not on systems considerably different from us. Rather than restricting the methodology of consciousness science, we should, at this point, restrict the range of systems upon which it is supposed to be built.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1306023/fullconsciousnessunfolding argumentfunctionalismrecurrencycausal structureIIT |
| spellingShingle | Marius Usher Marius Usher Niccolò Negro Niccolò Negro Hilla Jacobson Hilla Jacobson Naotsugu Tsuchiya Naotsugu Tsuchiya When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions Frontiers in Psychology consciousness unfolding argument functionalism recurrency causal structure IIT |
| title | When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions |
| title_full | When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions |
| title_fullStr | When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions |
| title_full_unstemmed | When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions |
| title_short | When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions |
| title_sort | when philosophical nuance matters safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions |
| topic | consciousness unfolding argument functionalism recurrency causal structure IIT |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1306023/full |
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