Naturalizing Self-Consciousness
The crucial problem of self-consciousness is how to account for knowing self-reference without launching into a regress or without presupposing self-consciousness rather than accounting for it (circle). In the literature we find two bottom-up proposals for solving the traditional problem: the postul...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages
2018-09-01
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| Series: | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
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| Online Access: | http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_7995_a9259d8d561c5997da7831085e4f5f41.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797723746540191744 |
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| author | رابرتو هوراسیو دِ سَ پِرِیرا |
| author_facet | رابرتو هوراسیو دِ سَ پِرِیرا |
| author_sort | رابرتو هوراسیو دِ سَ پِرِیرا |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The crucial problem of self-consciousness is how to account for knowing self-reference without launching into a regress or without presupposing self-consciousness rather than accounting for it (circle). In the literature we find two bottom-up proposals for solving the traditional problem: the postulation of nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness and the postulation of a pre-reflexive form of self-consciousness. However, none of them seems satisfactory for several reasons. In contrast, I believe that the only way of solving this traditional puzzle is to assume another bottom-up approach, namely the one that accepts Baker’s challenge to naturalism and provides a naturalist framework for self-consciousness; in Baker’s terms, to account for self-consciousness in non-intentional, non-semantic, and non-mental terms. That is the aim of this paper. My thesis rests on two claims. The first is the metaphysical claim that every creature enjoys a fundamental relation to itself, namely identity. The second is Dretske’s epistemological claim that representations do not require a Self, traditionally understood as the principle that spontaneously organizes mental activity and lies behind all intentional acts. Briefly, I argue for a naturalization of self-consciousness that postulates non-linguistic, naturalized, and selfless form of representation of the cognitive system based on the metaphysical, fundamental relation everyone has to himself, namely identity. Self-consciousness emerges when brain states are selflessly recruited through learning to represent the cognitive system itself as a subject. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T10:07:10Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-2e15837654484777836bd9b82a42663d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2251-7960 2423-4419 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T10:07:10Z |
| publishDate | 2018-09-01 |
| publisher | University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
| spelling | doaj.art-2e15837654484777836bd9b82a42663d2023-09-02T11:08:16ZengUniversity of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen LanguagesJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-79602423-44192018-09-0112241451707995Naturalizing Self-Consciousnessرابرتو هوراسیو دِ سَ پِرِیرا0استاد فلسفه، دانشگاه فدرال زیو دو ژانیرو برزیلThe crucial problem of self-consciousness is how to account for knowing self-reference without launching into a regress or without presupposing self-consciousness rather than accounting for it (circle). In the literature we find two bottom-up proposals for solving the traditional problem: the postulation of nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness and the postulation of a pre-reflexive form of self-consciousness. However, none of them seems satisfactory for several reasons. In contrast, I believe that the only way of solving this traditional puzzle is to assume another bottom-up approach, namely the one that accepts Baker’s challenge to naturalism and provides a naturalist framework for self-consciousness; in Baker’s terms, to account for self-consciousness in non-intentional, non-semantic, and non-mental terms. That is the aim of this paper. My thesis rests on two claims. The first is the metaphysical claim that every creature enjoys a fundamental relation to itself, namely identity. The second is Dretske’s epistemological claim that representations do not require a Self, traditionally understood as the principle that spontaneously organizes mental activity and lies behind all intentional acts. Briefly, I argue for a naturalization of self-consciousness that postulates non-linguistic, naturalized, and selfless form of representation of the cognitive system based on the metaphysical, fundamental relation everyone has to himself, namely identity. Self-consciousness emerges when brain states are selflessly recruited through learning to represent the cognitive system itself as a subject.http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_7995_a9259d8d561c5997da7831085e4f5f41.pdfSelf-consciousnessnonconceptual self-consciousnesspre-reflexive self-consciousnessnaturalization of self-consciousness |
| spellingShingle | رابرتو هوراسیو دِ سَ پِرِیرا Naturalizing Self-Consciousness Journal of Philosophical Investigations Self-consciousness nonconceptual self-consciousness pre-reflexive self-consciousness naturalization of self-consciousness |
| title | Naturalizing Self-Consciousness |
| title_full | Naturalizing Self-Consciousness |
| title_fullStr | Naturalizing Self-Consciousness |
| title_full_unstemmed | Naturalizing Self-Consciousness |
| title_short | Naturalizing Self-Consciousness |
| title_sort | naturalizing self consciousness |
| topic | Self-consciousness nonconceptual self-consciousness pre-reflexive self-consciousness naturalization of self-consciousness |
| url | http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_7995_a9259d8d561c5997da7831085e4f5f41.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT rạbrtwhwrạsywdisapiriyrạ naturalizingselfconsciousness |