Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence
Summary: Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple inf...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2021-12-01
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| Series: | iScience |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004221014760 |
| _version_ | 1819174229618196480 |
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| author | Ralf H.J.M. Kurvers Uri Hertz Jurgis Karpus Marta P. Balode Bertrand Jayles Ken Binmore Bahador Bahrami |
| author_facet | Ralf H.J.M. Kurvers Uri Hertz Jurgis Karpus Marta P. Balode Bertrand Jayles Ken Binmore Bahador Bahrami |
| author_sort | Ralf H.J.M. Kurvers |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Summary: Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple influencers competing for it. We study which strategy maximizes social influence under competition. Applying game theory to a scenario where two advisers compete for the attention of a client, we find that the rational solution for advisers is to communicate truthfully when favored by the client, but to lie when ignored. Across seven pre-registered studies, testing 802 participants, such a strategic adviser consistently outcompeted an honest adviser. Strategic dishonesty outperformed truth-telling in swaying individual voters, the majority vote in anonymously voting groups, and the consensus vote in communicating groups. Our findings help explain the success of political movements that thrive on disinformation, and vocal underdog politicians with no credible program. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-22T20:35:39Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-2e1a7f56dfa54f03889cf974cd721044 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2589-0042 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-22T20:35:39Z |
| publishDate | 2021-12-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | iScience |
| spelling | doaj.art-2e1a7f56dfa54f03889cf974cd7210442022-12-21T18:13:28ZengElsevieriScience2589-00422021-12-012412103505Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influenceRalf H.J.M. Kurvers0Uri Hertz1Jurgis Karpus2Marta P. Balode3Bertrand Jayles4Ken Binmore5Bahador Bahrami6Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany; Corresponding authorDepartment of Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, 199 Aba Khoushy Avenue Mount Carmel, Haifa, IsraelFaculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, General and Experimental Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Leopoldstr. 13, 80802 Munich, Germany; Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Munich, GermanyCenter for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, GermanyCenter for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, GermanyDepartment of Economics, University College London, Drayton House, 30 Gordon St, London WC1H 0AX, UKCenter for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany; Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, General and Experimental Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Leopoldstr. 13, 80802 Munich, Germany; Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham Surrey, London TW20 0EX, UKSummary: Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple influencers competing for it. We study which strategy maximizes social influence under competition. Applying game theory to a scenario where two advisers compete for the attention of a client, we find that the rational solution for advisers is to communicate truthfully when favored by the client, but to lie when ignored. Across seven pre-registered studies, testing 802 participants, such a strategic adviser consistently outcompeted an honest adviser. Strategic dishonesty outperformed truth-telling in swaying individual voters, the majority vote in anonymously voting groups, and the consensus vote in communicating groups. Our findings help explain the success of political movements that thrive on disinformation, and vocal underdog politicians with no credible program.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004221014760Biological sciencesNeuroscienceBehavioral neuroscienceBiocomputational methodSocial sciences |
| spellingShingle | Ralf H.J.M. Kurvers Uri Hertz Jurgis Karpus Marta P. Balode Bertrand Jayles Ken Binmore Bahador Bahrami Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence iScience Biological sciences Neuroscience Behavioral neuroscience Biocomputational method Social sciences |
| title | Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence |
| title_full | Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence |
| title_fullStr | Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence |
| title_short | Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence |
| title_sort | strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence |
| topic | Biological sciences Neuroscience Behavioral neuroscience Biocomputational method Social sciences |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004221014760 |
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