Moral judgments and validity of law
The paper is devoted to the analysis of A. V. Nekhaev’s arguments, which substantiate the primary moral basis of legal regulations. On the basis of modern discussions in the legal philosophy, the groundlessness of arbitrary transfer of moral judgments in the field of law is proved, as well as on...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2019-12-01
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| Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
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| Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2019/%D0%A2.%204,%20%E2%84%96%204%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/112-116%20%D0%94%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%90.%20%D0%91..pdf |
| Summary: | The paper is devoted to the analysis of A. V. Nekhaev’s arguments, which substantiate
the primary moral basis of legal regulations. On the basis of modern discussions
in the legal philosophy, the groundlessness of arbitrary transfer of moral judgments
in the field of law is proved, as well as on the example of judicial practice,
it is demonstrated that the judicial process does not include a moral interpretation
of actions, by virtue of which the nature of the sanction or punishment can be
determined. As additional arguments for the definition of the legal force theory,
the arguments of the normativism adapted to the modern realities of lawmaking
are given |
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| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |