Let's Play GOLF!
A central feature of the “free will defense” as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of “morally significant freedom” according to wh...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Catholic University of Louvain
2021-12-01
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| Series: | TheoLogica |
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| Online Access: | https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/theologica/article/view/20343 |
| _version_ | 1828960906443227136 |
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| author | Steven B. Cowan |
| author_facet | Steven B. Cowan |
| author_sort | Steven B. Cowan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | A central feature of the “free will defense” as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of “morally significant freedom” according to which free creatures, in order to do moral good, must be capable of moral evil. In this paper, I argue, first, that morally significant freedom is not required for free creatures to do moral good and, second, that other recent attempts to necessitate a creaturely capability for evil likewise fail. The upshot of my paper is that the free will defense simply won’t work because it is possible and feasible for God to create a world containing libertarianly free creatures capable of moral good and yet containing no moral evil. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-14T09:34:55Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-2e39156864264f7790d18abfb4ae2b58 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2593-0265 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-14T09:34:55Z |
| publishDate | 2021-12-01 |
| publisher | Catholic University of Louvain |
| record_format | Article |
| series | TheoLogica |
| spelling | doaj.art-2e39156864264f7790d18abfb4ae2b582022-12-21T23:07:57ZdeuCatholic University of LouvainTheoLogica2593-02652021-12-015210.14428/thl.v5i2.20343Let's Play GOLF!Steven B. Cowan0Lincoln Memorial UniversityA central feature of the “free will defense” as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of “morally significant freedom” according to which free creatures, in order to do moral good, must be capable of moral evil. In this paper, I argue, first, that morally significant freedom is not required for free creatures to do moral good and, second, that other recent attempts to necessitate a creaturely capability for evil likewise fail. The upshot of my paper is that the free will defense simply won’t work because it is possible and feasible for God to create a world containing libertarianly free creatures capable of moral good and yet containing no moral evil.https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/theologica/article/view/20343Problem of EvilFree Will DefenseAlvin PlantingaLibertarianismTheodicy |
| spellingShingle | Steven B. Cowan Let's Play GOLF! TheoLogica Problem of Evil Free Will Defense Alvin Plantinga Libertarianism Theodicy |
| title | Let's Play GOLF! |
| title_full | Let's Play GOLF! |
| title_fullStr | Let's Play GOLF! |
| title_full_unstemmed | Let's Play GOLF! |
| title_short | Let's Play GOLF! |
| title_sort | let s play golf |
| topic | Problem of Evil Free Will Defense Alvin Plantinga Libertarianism Theodicy |
| url | https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/theologica/article/view/20343 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stevenbcowan letsplaygolf |