The rationalist of Aquino: rescuing Aquinas from intellective determinism
Aquinas's theory of human action seems to reduce the will to the status of an obedient servant, who can only choose actions that intellect has judged approvingly. So how can Aquinas claim that the will is free? And can his theory account for our apparent ability to make choices that defy the di...
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| Médium: | Článek |
| Jazyk: | English |
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The University of Akureyri
2006-03-01
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| Edice: | Nordicum-Mediterraneum |
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| On-line přístup: | http://hdl.handle.net/1946/1063 |
| Shrnutí: | Aquinas's theory of human action seems to reduce the will to the status of an obedient servant, who can only choose actions that intellect has judged approvingly. So how can Aquinas claim that the will is free? And can his theory account for our apparent ability to make choices that defy the dictates of our own practical rationality? The keys to answering these questions lie in (1) Aquinas' attribution of freedom to reason as a whole, and (2) the role of intention in Aquinas' account. |
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| ISSN: | 1670-6242 |