Stackelberg game-theoretic model for low carbon energy market scheduling

Stackelberg game-theoretic model for low carbon energy market scheduling

Excessive carbon emissions have posed a threat to sustainable development. An appropriate market-based low carbon policy becomes the essence of regulating strategy for reducing carbon emissions in the energy sector. This study proposes a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to determine an optimal low c...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Weiqi Hua, Dan Li, Hongjian Sun, Peter Matthews
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2019-08-01
Series:IET Smart Grid
Subjects:
profitability
game theory
renewable energy sources
optimisation
power markets
air pollution control
power generation economics
government policies
environmental economics
pricing
sustainable development
stackelberg game-theoretic model
low carbon energy market scheduling
excessive carbon emissions
appropriate market-based low carbon policy
energy sector
optimal low carbon policy design
low-carbon generating sources
carbon price
energy consumption
carbon reductions
optimal policy decisions
optimal generation
consumption decisions
carbon mitigation
Online Access:https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-stg.2018.0109

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https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-stg.2018.0109

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