THIRD PARTY SANCTIONS IN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION
This paper discusses the relation between communication and preservation of social norms guarded by third-party sanctions. In 2001 Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak derived deductively the existence of such norms from a simple boundedly rational choice model. Their analysis was based on a perfect pu...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Sciendo
2017-06-01
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| Series: | Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2017-0021 |
| _version_ | 1819007707705769984 |
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| author | Obłój Jan Abramczuk Katarzyna |
| author_facet | Obłój Jan Abramczuk Katarzyna |
| author_sort | Obłój Jan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper discusses the relation between communication and preservation of social norms guarded by third-party sanctions. In 2001 Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak derived deductively the existence of such norms from a simple boundedly rational choice model. Their analysis was based on a perfect public information case. We take into account communication and analyse at the micro level the process of production and interpretation of information on which decisions are based. We show that when information is fully private and we allow for communication a state of anomie can result. If some social control mechanisms are available, social stability can be maintained. The less efficient the social control mechanisms however, the more restrictive rules will be needed to sustain the social norms. Furthermore not all cognitive strategies for interpreting received messages are equally effective. Strategies based on reputation are better than strategies based on profit analysis. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T00:28:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-2f8cfe7795f547b483a049db69b912f6 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0860-150X 2199-6059 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T00:28:52Z |
| publishDate | 2017-06-01 |
| publisher | Sciendo |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric |
| spelling | doaj.art-2f8cfe7795f547b483a049db69b912f62022-12-21T19:21:55ZengSciendoStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric0860-150X2199-60592017-06-0150110913810.1515/slgr-2017-0021slgr-2017-0021THIRD PARTY SANCTIONS IN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATIONObłój Jan0Abramczuk Katarzyna1Oxford University, Oxfordshire, UKUniversity of Warsaw, Warsaw, PolandThis paper discusses the relation between communication and preservation of social norms guarded by third-party sanctions. In 2001 Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak derived deductively the existence of such norms from a simple boundedly rational choice model. Their analysis was based on a perfect public information case. We take into account communication and analyse at the micro level the process of production and interpretation of information on which decisions are based. We show that when information is fully private and we allow for communication a state of anomie can result. If some social control mechanisms are available, social stability can be maintained. The less efficient the social control mechanisms however, the more restrictive rules will be needed to sustain the social norms. Furthermore not all cognitive strategies for interpreting received messages are equally effective. Strategies based on reputation are better than strategies based on profit analysis.https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2017-0021game theorythird-party sanctionssocial normssocial controlprivate informationcommunicationlies detection |
| spellingShingle | Obłój Jan Abramczuk Katarzyna THIRD PARTY SANCTIONS IN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric game theory third-party sanctions social norms social control private information communication lies detection |
| title | THIRD PARTY SANCTIONS IN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION |
| title_full | THIRD PARTY SANCTIONS IN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION |
| title_fullStr | THIRD PARTY SANCTIONS IN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION |
| title_full_unstemmed | THIRD PARTY SANCTIONS IN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION |
| title_short | THIRD PARTY SANCTIONS IN GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION |
| title_sort | third party sanctions in games with communication |
| topic | game theory third-party sanctions social norms social control private information communication lies detection |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2017-0021 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT obłojjan thirdpartysanctionsingameswithcommunication AT abramczukkatarzyna thirdpartysanctionsingameswithcommunication |