Is extracting data the same as possessing data?
Proof-of-retrievability schemes have been a topic of considerable recent interest. In these schemes, a client 𝖢$\mathsf {C}$ gives a file M to a server 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$ with the understanding that 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$ will securely store M. A suitable challenge-response protocol is invoked by 𝖢$\mathsf {C}$...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
De Gruyter
2014-06-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2013-0034 |
| _version_ | 1811212560565796864 |
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| author | Stinson Douglas R. Upadhyay Jalaj |
| author_facet | Stinson Douglas R. Upadhyay Jalaj |
| author_sort | Stinson Douglas R. |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Proof-of-retrievability schemes have been
a topic of considerable recent interest.
In these schemes,
a client 𝖢$\mathsf {C}$ gives a file M to a server 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$ with the understanding
that 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$ will securely store M.
A suitable challenge-response protocol is invoked by 𝖢$\mathsf {C}$ in order for 𝖢$\mathsf {C}$
to gain confidence that M is indeed being correctly stored by 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$.
The definition of proof-of-retrievability schemes is based on the notion of
an extractor ℰ$\mathcal {E}$ that can recover the file once the
challenge-response protocol is executed a sufficient number of times.
In this paper, we propose a new type of scheme that we term a
proof-of-data-observability scheme.
Our definition tries to capture the stronger requirement that 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$ must have
an actual copy of M in its memory space while it executes the challenge-response protocol.
We give some examples of schemes that satisfy this new
security definition. As well, we analyze the efficiency and security of the protocols we present,
and we prove some necessary conditions for the existence of these kinds of protocols. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T05:31:07Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-2fc83a13065c49e2bd0bf30e1099114a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1862-2976 1862-2984 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T05:31:07Z |
| publishDate | 2014-06-01 |
| publisher | De Gruyter |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
| spelling | doaj.art-2fc83a13065c49e2bd0bf30e1099114a2022-12-22T03:46:04ZengDe GruyterJournal of Mathematical Cryptology1862-29761862-29842014-06-018218920710.1515/jmc-2013-0034Is extracting data the same as possessing data?Stinson Douglas R.0Upadhyay Jalaj1David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, CanadaDavid R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, CanadaProof-of-retrievability schemes have been a topic of considerable recent interest. In these schemes, a client 𝖢$\mathsf {C}$ gives a file M to a server 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$ with the understanding that 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$ will securely store M. A suitable challenge-response protocol is invoked by 𝖢$\mathsf {C}$ in order for 𝖢$\mathsf {C}$ to gain confidence that M is indeed being correctly stored by 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$. The definition of proof-of-retrievability schemes is based on the notion of an extractor ℰ$\mathcal {E}$ that can recover the file once the challenge-response protocol is executed a sufficient number of times. In this paper, we propose a new type of scheme that we term a proof-of-data-observability scheme. Our definition tries to capture the stronger requirement that 𝖲$\mathsf {S}$ must have an actual copy of M in its memory space while it executes the challenge-response protocol. We give some examples of schemes that satisfy this new security definition. As well, we analyze the efficiency and security of the protocols we present, and we prove some necessary conditions for the existence of these kinds of protocols.https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2013-0034proof-of-retrievabilityproof-of-data-observability94a60 |
| spellingShingle | Stinson Douglas R. Upadhyay Jalaj Is extracting data the same as possessing data? Journal of Mathematical Cryptology proof-of-retrievability proof-of-data-observability 94a60 |
| title | Is extracting data the same as possessing data? |
| title_full | Is extracting data the same as possessing data? |
| title_fullStr | Is extracting data the same as possessing data? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Is extracting data the same as possessing data? |
| title_short | Is extracting data the same as possessing data? |
| title_sort | is extracting data the same as possessing data |
| topic | proof-of-retrievability proof-of-data-observability 94a60 |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2013-0034 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stinsondouglasr isextractingdatathesameaspossessingdata AT upadhyayjalaj isextractingdatathesameaspossessingdata |