Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments?
Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2013-07-01
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| Series: | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/26841 |
| _version_ | 1811270789727518720 |
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| author | Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves |
| author_facet | Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves |
| author_sort | Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism is then extended to his sentimentalist theory, that accounts for how emotions are integrated into moral judgments. The central problem is that Prinz’s view fails to capture the rational aspect of moral evaluation. I make this failure explicit and defend that some version or other of neosentimentalism is a more promising route. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T22:08:20Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-3170298b71ce4417864c77d4a802b097 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1677-2954 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T22:08:20Z |
| publishDate | 2013-07-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj.art-3170298b71ce4417864c77d4a802b0972022-12-22T03:14:50ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaEthic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy1677-29542013-07-0112111312610.5007/1677-2954.2013v12n1p11320426Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments?Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves0The University of Texas at AustinJesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism is then extended to his sentimentalist theory, that accounts for how emotions are integrated into moral judgments. The central problem is that Prinz’s view fails to capture the rational aspect of moral evaluation. I make this failure explicit and defend that some version or other of neosentimentalism is a more promising route.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/26841jesse prinzemotionemotionismsentimentalist theoryneosentimentalism |
| spellingShingle | Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments? Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy jesse prinz emotion emotionism sentimentalist theory neosentimentalism |
| title | Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments? |
| title_full | Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments? |
| title_fullStr | Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments? |
| title_short | Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments? |
| title_sort | are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments |
| topic | jesse prinz emotion emotionism sentimentalist theory neosentimentalism |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/26841 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marcoaureliosousaalves areemotionsnecessaryandsufficientformakingmoraljudgments |