Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity
The prominent dual process model of moral cognition suggests that reasoners intuitively detect that harming others is wrong (deontological System-1 morality) but have to engage in demanding deliberation to realize that harm can be acceptable depending on the consequences (utilitarian System-2 morali...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2017-03-01
|
| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005696/type/journal_article |
| _version_ | 1797695968966082560 |
|---|---|
| author | Michal Białek Wim De Neys |
| author_facet | Michal Białek Wim De Neys |
| author_sort | Michal Białek |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The prominent dual process model of moral cognition suggests that reasoners intuitively detect that harming others is wrong (deontological System-1 morality) but have to engage in demanding deliberation to realize that harm can be acceptable depending on the consequences (utilitarian System-2 morality). But the nature of the interaction between the processes is not clear. To address this key issue we tested whether deontological reasoners also intuitively grasp the utilitarian dimensions of classic moral dilemmas. In three studies subjects solved moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions while performing a demanding concurrent load task. Results show that reasoners’ sensitivity to conflicting moral perspectives, as reflected in decreased decision confidence and increased experienced processing difficulty, was unaffected by cognitive load. We discuss how these findings argue for a hybrid dual process model interpretation in which System-1 cues both a deontological and utilitarian intuition. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T03:19:57Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-33a100a852384fbf8160ab2325fec268 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T03:19:57Z |
| publishDate | 2017-03-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-33a100a852384fbf8160ab2325fec2682023-09-03T14:02:45ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752017-03-011214816710.1017/S1930297500005696Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivityMichal Białek0Wim De Neys1Kozminski University, Department of Economic Psychology, Centre for Economic Psychology and Decision Sciences, Jagiellońska 59, 03–301, Warsaw, PolandLaPsyDE (CNRS Unit 8240), Sorbonne—Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne — Labo A. Binet 46, rue Saint Jacques, 75005 Paris, FranceThe prominent dual process model of moral cognition suggests that reasoners intuitively detect that harming others is wrong (deontological System-1 morality) but have to engage in demanding deliberation to realize that harm can be acceptable depending on the consequences (utilitarian System-2 morality). But the nature of the interaction between the processes is not clear. To address this key issue we tested whether deontological reasoners also intuitively grasp the utilitarian dimensions of classic moral dilemmas. In three studies subjects solved moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions while performing a demanding concurrent load task. Results show that reasoners’ sensitivity to conflicting moral perspectives, as reflected in decreased decision confidence and increased experienced processing difficulty, was unaffected by cognitive load. We discuss how these findings argue for a hybrid dual process model interpretation in which System-1 cues both a deontological and utilitarian intuition.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005696/type/journal_articleutilitrianismdeontologydual-system theorymoral judgmentcognitive load |
| spellingShingle | Michal Białek Wim De Neys Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity Judgment and Decision Making utilitrianism deontology dual-system theory moral judgment cognitive load |
| title | Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity |
| title_full | Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity |
| title_fullStr | Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity |
| title_short | Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity |
| title_sort | dual processes and moral conflict evidence for deontological reasoners intuitive utilitarian sensitivity |
| topic | utilitrianism deontology dual-system theory moral judgment cognitive load |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005696/type/journal_article |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT michalbiałek dualprocessesandmoralconflictevidencefordeontologicalreasonersintuitiveutilitariansensitivity AT wimdeneys dualprocessesandmoralconflictevidencefordeontologicalreasonersintuitiveutilitariansensitivity |