Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia
I propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a “public goods trap” rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested inte...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional de Colombia
2019-10-01
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| Series: | Cuadernos de Economía |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ceconomia/article/view/71224 |
| _version_ | 1818059203616440320 |
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| author | Leopoldo Fergusson |
| author_facet | Leopoldo Fergusson |
| author_sort | Leopoldo Fergusson |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | I propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a “public goods trap” rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested interests in the status quo. Political rents are particularly problematic, partly because reformers face a curse of dimensionality: many things have to work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate. Finally, a very clientelistic pattern of political exchange consolidates a weak state, and weak states are fertile ground for clientelism. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-10T13:12:48Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-33a823934be5426bb41a57b21fa94d45 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0121-4772 2248-4337 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-10T13:12:48Z |
| publishDate | 2019-10-01 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional de Colombia |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Cuadernos de Economía |
| spelling | doaj.art-33a823934be5426bb41a57b21fa94d452022-12-22T01:47:37ZengUniversidad Nacional de ColombiaCuadernos de Economía0121-47722248-43372019-10-01387867170010.15446/cuad.econ.v38n78.7122451138Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in ColombiaLeopoldo Fergusson0Universidad de los AndesI propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a “public goods trap” rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested interests in the status quo. Political rents are particularly problematic, partly because reformers face a curse of dimensionality: many things have to work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate. Finally, a very clientelistic pattern of political exchange consolidates a weak state, and weak states are fertile ground for clientelism.https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ceconomia/article/view/71224conflictstate capacitypublic goodspolitical economy |
| spellingShingle | Leopoldo Fergusson Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia Cuadernos de Economía conflict state capacity public goods political economy |
| title | Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia |
| title_full | Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia |
| title_fullStr | Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia |
| title_short | Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia |
| title_sort | who wants violence the political economy of conflict and state building in colombia |
| topic | conflict state capacity public goods political economy |
| url | https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ceconomia/article/view/71224 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT leopoldofergusson whowantsviolencethepoliticaleconomyofconflictandstatebuildingincolombia |