The Indian Supreme Court and Federalism

The article situates the Indian Supreme Court within the architecture of Indian federalism. It reflects on the extent to which the composition of the Court as well as its jurisprudence has enabled the Court to operate as a guardian of Indian federalism. The Indian Supreme Court occupies a special po...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Rekha Saxena, Wilfried Swenden
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Liège Library 2017-01-01
Series:Fédéralisme-Régionalisme
Description
Summary:The article situates the Indian Supreme Court within the architecture of Indian federalism. It reflects on the extent to which the composition of the Court as well as its jurisprudence has enabled the Court to operate as a guardian of Indian federalism. The Indian Supreme Court occupies a special position among Supreme Courts in that the judiciary has monopolized the Court's appointment process. We show that this has resulted in the appointment of justices who are drawn from across the regions of the state. However, the jurisprudence of the Court has not necessarily become more favourable of states' rights as a result, nor has it been insulated from political influence. We demonstrate that the Court has developed a more favourable reading of states' rights in its policing of President's Rule or in reading 'federalism' into the basic structure of the constitution. Arguably coalition government and liberalization created a more favourable climate for the defence of states' rights. Yet, the Court has adopted a more mixed approach in its policing of federal and state legislative powers and it has retained a restrictive reading of the treaty making and foreign powers of the states, notwithstanding their growing role under liberalization.
ISSN:1374-3864
1374-3864