Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality
Non-naturalists about the normative face the problem of providing a metaphysical explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Recently, Gideon Rosen has argued that non-naturalists can side-step this problem by rejecting strong supervenience and the view that normative truths...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/85149 |
| _version_ | 1797402177157726208 |
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| author | Rafael Graebin Vogelmann |
| author_facet | Rafael Graebin Vogelmann |
| author_sort | Rafael Graebin Vogelmann |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description |
Non-naturalists about the normative face the problem of providing a metaphysical explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Recently, Gideon Rosen has argued that non-naturalists can side-step this problem by rejecting strong supervenience and the view that normative truths are metaphysically necessary. Rosen proposes to take normative truths to be normatively necessary, where normative necessity is different from and irreducible to metaphysical necessity. I argue that if Rosen is right, that creates a deeper problem for robust ethical realism (the view that there are mind-independent, non-natural moral facts). According to robust ethical realism, it is a normative fact that persons are an especially valuable kind of being. But if Rosen is right, that is a metaphysically contingent fact. The existence of persons is also contingent. According to robust ethical realism, then, there is a striking match between what the normative facts happen to be and the kinds of beings that happen to exist. Persons could have failed to exist and they could have failed to be valuable, but it just so happens to be a fact about the natural world that they exist and a normative fact that they have value. Given that this match is accidental, it amounts to a miraculous coincidence. To the extent that commitment to unexplained coincidences counts against a view, robust ethical realism faces a problem.
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T02:20:38Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-34868dce25d341be92f9c9c3a6b39224 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1677-2954 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T02:20:38Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj.art-34868dce25d341be92f9c9c3a6b392242023-12-06T16:56:50ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaEthic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy1677-29542023-11-0122110.5007/1677-2954.2023.e85149Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of moralityRafael Graebin Vogelmann0Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte Non-naturalists about the normative face the problem of providing a metaphysical explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Recently, Gideon Rosen has argued that non-naturalists can side-step this problem by rejecting strong supervenience and the view that normative truths are metaphysically necessary. Rosen proposes to take normative truths to be normatively necessary, where normative necessity is different from and irreducible to metaphysical necessity. I argue that if Rosen is right, that creates a deeper problem for robust ethical realism (the view that there are mind-independent, non-natural moral facts). According to robust ethical realism, it is a normative fact that persons are an especially valuable kind of being. But if Rosen is right, that is a metaphysically contingent fact. The existence of persons is also contingent. According to robust ethical realism, then, there is a striking match between what the normative facts happen to be and the kinds of beings that happen to exist. Persons could have failed to exist and they could have failed to be valuable, but it just so happens to be a fact about the natural world that they exist and a normative fact that they have value. Given that this match is accidental, it amounts to a miraculous coincidence. To the extent that commitment to unexplained coincidences counts against a view, robust ethical realism faces a problem. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/85149Normative realismMetaphysical necessitySupervenienceCoincidencePersons |
| spellingShingle | Rafael Graebin Vogelmann Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy Normative realism Metaphysical necessity Supervenience Coincidence Persons |
| title | Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality |
| title_full | Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality |
| title_fullStr | Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality |
| title_short | Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality |
| title_sort | robust ethical realism necessary truths and the miracle of morality |
| topic | Normative realism Metaphysical necessity Supervenience Coincidence Persons |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/85149 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT rafaelgraebinvogelmann robustethicalrealismnecessarytruthsandthemiracleofmorality |